[RFC] Cryptex Keepers Rewards (CKR)

Proposals
1

Summary

The present RFC proposes a pilot program with the goal of rewarding Cryptex Keepers for their governance contributions, taking up on the discussion from the Delegate Rewards thread and all of the meaningful comments from delegates. Those mentioned contributions shall be composed of both on-chain and off-chain activities mapped during the January - May 2026 period.

To that end, a total of 23,672 CTX will be distributed upon the described criteria in order to set a baseline that will be iterated on, aiming to have a cohesive governance system based on the Cryptex roadmap, including the launch of Cryptex40 and the staking system migration.

Motivation

As mentioned in the Staking and Delegate rewards thread, this initiative is a step towards a more robust governance system, one where incentives are aligned, and active participation is properly recognized.

In that sense, this should be seen as a complementary next step on the efforts made on onboarding more delegates to the DAO and a way to bootstrap new participants that will contribute to the expansion of Cryptex with their expertise, commitment and representation.

Moreso, with CIP-45 being unanimously approved, we believe that the timing is right to begin with a pilot that will hopefully merge into the staking program in the near future, but, on a first run, we consider that having separate pathways is beneficial in order to understand and assess both initiatives separately, since there are already several moving pieces at the time.

The CKR Pilot

Cryptex is rightfully proud of its governance metrics: having ~20% of delegated supply is something that other protocols heavily struggle to reach (if they even do so), but of course, that’s the starting point of governance activity.

The challenge is now to have that delegated supply actively - and consistently - showing up to vote, which shall be the main objective of the CKR Pilot, but not the only one. To illustrate this, only 3 delegates reached an 80% historical participation rate, a metric that certainly can be improved.

On the other hand, we consider voting to be definitely not the only activity that makes up for an active delegate, but the truth is that there isn’t a universally accepted answer for this. Definitions of the delegate role vary from protocol to protocol and adapt and rely on its communities or a particular momentum.

One of the aspects that should be considered to this end is that there is necessarily a subjective component to that definition since what is valuable may change given those variations described. In that sense, we don’t think that subjective equals arbitrary, but we want to bring awareness that very rigid frameworks may sometimes defeat the purpose of adapting quickly to changing circumstances.

Proposed split

Therefore, we consider that the CKR CTX allocation should be weighted: having 70% of the rewards based on on-chain activity and 30% based on off-chain contributions. In order to reflect different ranges of participation, we are suggesting 3 tiers for each of the splits.

  1. On-chain activity (70% weight)

For the purpose of the CIP, on-chain activity is understood as voting on CIPs, and three tiers shall reflect the Keepers’ participation rate in order to reach rewards. The purpose of the tiered approach is to recognize perfect participation while also setting a strong baseline in order to reach rewards.

  • Tier 1 (80–89%) → 80% of cap.

  • Tier 2 (90–99%) → 90% of cap.

  • Tier 3 (100%) → full cap.

The expected impact is an increase in unique voters, Voting Power and further secure the quorum.

  1. Off-chain activity (30% weight)

Off-chain activity shall be composed of contributions outside of voting. Those activities will initially comprise:

  • Contributing to Cryptex Social Media efforts as per the set guidelines.

  • Providing feedback to RFCs that gets reflected in the proposal’s final version.

  • Providing feedback in an ongoing initiative that is adopted by its operators.

To this end, the following tiers are proposed as per a scoring system

  • Score 0 → 0 CTX.

  • Score 1 → 33.33% of the cap per Keeper.

  • Score 2 → 66.66% of the cap per Keeper.

  • Score 3 → 100% of the cap per Keeper.

To the end of assigning the scores as well as monitoring the overall execution of the program, we suggest that a small team be assigned for the CKR unfolding. This task force should be composed of one Keeper and one Foundation member in order to ensure proper alignment of the efforts and have both perspectives in the given evaluation process.

The selection process of the Keeper could be made by the Foundation or an off-chain vote in order to have community signalling. If the latter is chosen, an Application Thread could be opened in the forum to assess candidacies. The only caveat is naturally execution time.

Also, a total of 3,100 CTX is contemplated within the budget for the operational expenses relative to the Task Force.

Again, this pilot should serve as a first exploratory iteration that can then expand into other mechanisms described in the Delegates Reward thread, noting that some of those are certainly interesting, although fairly experimental. Also, a goal of this set Task Force should be to explore automatization of the off-chain parameters for the upcoming iterations.

CKR Parameters

Given the current activity, we estimated a base of 20 eligible Keepers in order to participate in the pilot, which led to the following expenses scenario. It is worth mentioning that each CTX that is not distributed is returned to the treasury (i.e if Keepers do not reach the required Tiers to reach the full cap)

In order to experiment with different parameters, we invite everyone to play around with this artifact we created and served as input for the current RFC. Feel free to reach out with any questions!

Breakdown

Pools

  • Net reward pool (after Task Force compensation): 20,572 CTX (≈ $11,660).

  • On-chain pool: 14,400 CTX (≈ $8,162).

  • Off-chain pool: 6,171 CTX (≈ $3,498).

On-chain Tiers

  • On-chain cap/Keeper: 720 CTX (≈ $408).

  • Per vote cap: 180 CTX (≈ $102).

  • Tier 1 (80–89%) → 80% of cap → 576 CTX each.

  • Tier 2 (90–99%) → 90% of cap → 648 CTX each.

  • Tier 3 (100%) → full cap → 720 CTX each.

  • Each CTX that is not distributed is returned to the treasury. For instance, if Keepers are in Tier 1 or Tier 2, the remaining portion of their cap will be returned to the treasury.

Off-chain Scores

  • Score 0 → 0 CTX.

  • Score 1 → 33.33% of the cap per Keeper of the off-chain.

  • Score 2 → 66.66% of the cap per Keeper of the off-chain.

  • Score 3 → 100% of the cap per Keeper of the off-chain.

  • Each CTX that is not distributed is returned to the treasury. The cap per Keeper for each score will depend on the number of Keepers qualified for off-chain scores.

Distribution Summary

  • Total allocated to Keepers: 20,572 CTX (≈ $11,660).

  • Total allocated to Task Force: 3,100 CTX (≈ $1,757).

  • On-chain allocation: 14,400 CTX (≈ $8,162) - Cap per Keeper 720 CTX (≈ $408).

  • Off-chain allocation: 6,171 CTX (≈ $3,498).

3 Likes
2

Thanks @SEEDGov for putting this together. Really glad to see the discussion from the previous threads turned into a concrete proposal.

Overall I’m supportive of the RFC as proposed. The 70/30 split, tiered participation model, and separate allocation from staking are all in line with what we discussed. The budget feels reasonable for a pilot and having undistributed CTX return to the treasury is a nice safety net.

A couple of small thoughts:

  • Good to see the Jan-May retroactive window, so current contributions already count.
  • The Task Force model (1 keeper + 1 Foundation member) seems like a fair compromise for evaluating offchain quality without overcomplicating things.
  • For future iterations, would be worth exploring automated offchain tracking tools (like Karma or Curia’s DRS) to reduce manual overhead as the program scales.

Happy to support this moving to a vote.

1 Like
3

Thank you @SEEDGov for putting together this proposal. I have some clarifying questions about the Task Force model:

  1. Is the Task Force allocation split between the Keeper and the Foundation member, or does it all go to the Keeper?
  2. Are the Task Force members excluded from the on-chain and off-chain allocations?
  3. Should we expect the full budget for the Task Force’s operational expenses to be consumed? Or is this a reimbursement-style budget for expenses incurred?
  4. What’s the rationale behind Task Force staffing including a Keeper?

General thoughts:

I’ll reiterate that I have concerns with trying to implement a keeper rewards system that incorporates any off-chain activity component. Furthermore, I also have reservations that Keepers are truly generating 4,734 CTX/month worth of value back to the DAO. Finally, the tiered approach appears unnecessarily complex upon initial review. Let me know if you’d like to dig deeper into any of these.

All of that said, I appreciate the thought put into this proposal, and I’m open to trying it as a pilot program.

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4

Thank you for putting this up, SEED.

Good thought has been put into this proposal, and we appreciate that.

Some QQ

Does this include historic participation in votes? Or it starts when the delegate became a member of the community?

Also, highlighting my previous question in the original discussion thread

I don’t see any mention of this here. What qualifies one to be a keeper?

2 Likes
5

Thanks for the feedback so far! Answering the Qs below

  1. The amount was meant as for the Keeper role. In similar cases in order to avoid double-compensating Foundation members tend to opt-out from compensations.

  2. Great question and definitely open to debate. Our opinion is that they should be excluded from those allocations since they are the ones who’ll be overseeing the program and accounting for off-chain contributions so might be a kind of judge and jury situation.

  3. It is expected that the budget is fully utilized. Again, as a pilot program the proper adjustments can be made on the next iterations.

  4. It felt uneven to only have Foundation determining value from contributions, something that certainly benefits from different viewpoints (and the more the better actually). At the end of the day if this is a DAO led initiative it is reasonable to have a Keeper voice within that discussion.

Also good Qs!

  1. For the sake of simplicity we didn’t add historical participation just because there are only 3 Keeper that met the baseline PR% (pre pilot). Given the recent governance changes and expected activity we wanted to create a fresh baseline of participation and build on top of it.

  2. Just to be clear this CKR is a pilot for rewarding Keeper activity as per the set guidelines, there were Keepers before and will be after and during the program. The aim is to channelize as much as CTX in votings as possible and to explore off-chain contributions. In that sense, the activities themselves will be the one setting the qualifications for rewards.

2 Likes
6

Thanks @SEEDGov for putting this out for discussion.

Caps
Are the caps for on-chain and off-chain portions both determined by number of eligible keepers?
Or on-chain cap is fixed at 720 CTX (or potentially less if fewer votes in the period) while off-chain cap is 6171 CTX divided by number of eligible keepers?

If the latter, it seems very possible given our relatively small number of delegates that off-chain activity could account for 50+% of any given keeper’s allocations. Seems to me that both caps need to be variable or both caps need to be fixed if we want to stay true to our 70%/30% targets.

Task Force
I think the Task Force allocation seems too high. Unless I’m misunderstanding, a very active keeper might be awarded 1k-1.5k CTX per period in reward allocations, while in contrast the selected Task Force keeper (even if excluded from rewards allocations) would earn 3.1k CTX per period? This seems quite skewed. Perhaps the Task Force keeper should be capped at no more than the highest rewarded delegate’s total (sum of on and off chain).

Eligibility
What are the criteria for being an “eligible keeper” for on-chain and off-chain portions? Is it just based on the on-chain and off-chain activity tiers that will be assessed or are there other facors? Since we use the term “eligible” in this proposal I’m just suggesting we be very clear on what we mean.

Thanks again to everyone for the great discussion on these proposals!!

1 Like
7

Great questions @DesertDwelr, let me try to clear this up.

Caps

The 70/30 split is purely a budget allocation thing, not a target for how each keeper’s compensation should break down. So yes, it’s totally possible that off-chain ends up being a bigger chunk of what a given keeper receives depending on how many people qualify for each part of the programme.

That said, the reason we went with a fixed cap on the on-chain side is the following: without one, you could end up in a situation where only a handful of keepers qualify, and they walk away with something like $4k just for casting a few votes. That felt like overpaying for on-chain participation, which is relatively straightforward to do. So the cap is there to keep that in check. Any unspent portion, meaning if a keeper qualifies but doesn’t hit the 100% threshold, goes back to the treasury.

The off-chain bucket works differently. It’s always fully distributed between whoever qualifies. No leftovers returned to the treasury. The reasoning there is that off-chain contributions are harder to do consistently, so those who clear the bar should get a proper reward for it. So to directly answer your question: on-chain cap is fixed (and scales with the number of eligible keepers), off-chain pool gets split between qualifiers.

Now, the alternative would be to make the on-chain cap variable too, and redistribute any unspent amounts among those who did hit 100%. For this pilot, though, we think the current structure makes sense but we can discuss it moving forward. The whole point is to test the waters, see how participation shakes out, and learn from it.

We can always adjust the design for the next cycle based on what we see. Happy to keep the conversation going on this one!

Task Force

We kindly disagree. The set amounts not only sit within the benchmark, but it’s not about comparing against Keeper activity. There’s also small caveat that this framework relies on and it’s not about being the most “active” but the most impactful.

Eligibility

As we mentioned above, the CKR is about rewarding keeper activity, therefore the criteria are set within the mentioned activity parameters. There sure are some angles to explore in the future: VP thresholds, Keeper profiles, etc, but at this point we think this pilot is a great place to start.

1 Like
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Thank you for all the clarifications @SEEDGov.

We are in favor of this proposal, and we endorse moving this on to voting.

1 Like
9

Thanks for your response and sorry for my delayed response - I was away on Spring Break. My reaction to your statements:

Caps

My thought was if the goal was a 70/30 distribution (with some support even for starting at 100/0), it really doesn’t make sense to move forward with a proposal that almost certainly will result in an even higher off-chain distribution. Your response presented the option for making both variable. The other option would be to cap (and scale) the off-chain bucket as well (manage the cap using the same methods as the on-chain bucket). Neither on-chain or off-chain portions should have to be fully distributed if we don’t have sufficient participation.

Task Force

I agree impact is what’s important and I still believe the impact of someone who is judging the inputs of others is NOT more than double the impact of the most active keeper(s). Governance value happens thru governance activity, not thru assessing keepers. I feel this allocation is too high.

Eligibility

I think we have different opinions about what CKR is rewarding. But this isn’t my proposal and it doesn’t sound like thresholds, delegate sizes, etc. are in your vision. Obviously we can always change things later, but lets all please recognize that whatever we start with is likely to be the baseline that gets modestly tweaked as we go forward. But these seem to be some fundamental differences in how we see rewards that in my opinion would ideally be figured out up front.

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I endorse this proposal!

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Hello everyone!

Thanks @SEEDGov for the hard work put into this CKR Pilot. It is a clear and well-structured proposal that addresses our governance needs directly.

I fully endorse this initiative and look forward to seeing it in action. This is a great step toward a more active and accountable community.

Let’s keep it up!

1 Like
12

Catching up with all that has been said, I can stand behind this proposal with the understanding it is distributing adequately & intentionally; both preservation of capital and proper allocation based off input and quality of such input. Thank you @SEEDGov for putting this together

1 Like
13

Than you @SEEDGov for putting this together.
I would like to make everyone aware that this proposal gathered the required number of endorsements to move up for a vote but given that we experienced significant delays in the full launch and migration of the Aragon based governance we should re-asses the numbers and timeline.
I would recommend recalculating the amounts on a yearly bases that way we will be able to process rewards on June (Measuring activity from Jan-Jun) and December (Jul-Dec).

I would love to hear comments about this as we should look to way this proposal voted on during the first cycle on June.

14

I think CKR should remain clearly smaller than staking rewards. Stakers are the ones locking capital and taking the opportunity cost/risk of the lock. Keepers/delegates are doing important work, but in many cases they are voting with power delegated by CTX holders rather than capital they personally locked.

So my suggestion would be 50,000 CTX/year total for CKR, split into 25,000 CTX for Jan-Jun and 25,000 CTX for Jul-Dec.

Jan-Jun can be processed retroactively based on actual participation. Jul-Dec should be reviewed before being finalized, so the DAO can adjust based on participation, proposal volume, and treasury conditions.

For the structure, I would prefer the majority to be based on objective onchain participation, such as voting participation, proposal review, public rationales, and governance support.

The offchain component should be smaller and capped because it is more subjective. Task force compensation should also be capped so it does not exceed what the most active Keepers can earn.

I do think the DAO needs to take governance incentives seriously. Stakers, delegates, contributors, and the DAO as a whole should be aligned.
CKR should reward real governance work, while staking rewards should remain the larger incentive because stakers are the ones locking capital.

15

+1 to @dnkta.eth comment.. the stakers are securing the network which I think is a bit more vital than crypt keepers. I do also think allowing retroactive application of the rewards is a good idea to reward those active but maybe missed the opportunity to claim.

However regarding task force compensation, it depends the level of work/insight required to complete that task, I agree there should be a cap, but if it requires much offline/online work, then that should be considered and potentially a higher reward than that of a CK as groundwork can be just as if not more pivotal.

All in all, I think this proposal seems pretty fair. Still in favor.

16

In light of recent budget activities, I don’t see Keeper rewards as a necessary expense prior to protocol revenue generation. While clearly well-written and thought out, I oppose this proposal for now. That said, I’m still open to trying a pilot program in the future once we have more operational clarity.

17

Following up on the feedback in this thread and the discussion from last Friday’s call, we’ve rerun the numbers for the pilot.

The updated figures below now account for:

  • A one-month extension of the programme (running from January to June);

  • The current CTX price ≈$0.36; and

  • The requirement that the Task Force compensation must be capped at the value of the highest-compensated delegate.

To establish the Task Force cap, we first calculated the maximum possible payout a single, perfect delegate could achieve under our baseline scenario, which assumes 20 eligible Keepers splitting the off-chain pool evenly:

  • Max On-chain Payout (6 months): 1,359 CTX ($489.60);

  • Max Off-chain Payout (Score 3): 486 CTX ($174.90); and

  • Maximum Single Delegate Payout: 1,845 CTX ($664.50).

Because the original unadjusted Task Force budget ($1,757 or 4,878 CTX) exceeds this ceiling, it has been scaled down to comply with this Keepers’ feedback. Since the Foundation member isn’t going to be compensated for their role within the Task Force, the operational budget of the Task Force is capped at a single delegate’s earnings.

Updated Distribution Summary

  • Total Pilot Budget: 38,748 CTX (≈ $13,957)

  • On-chain pool: 27,192 CTX (≈ $9,794) - Scaled to 6 months (+20%);

  • Off-chain pool: 9,711 CTX (≈ $3,498) - Held flat; and

  • Task Force Pool: 1,845 CTX (≈$664.50) - Reduced to match max delegate cap.

On-chain Tiers (6-Month Scale)

  • On-chain Cap per Keeper: 1,133 CTX updates to 1,359 CTX ($489.60);

  • Per Vote Cap: 283 CTX updates to 340 CTX ($122.40);

  • Tier 1 (80–89%): 80% of cap → 1,087 CTX each;

  • Tier 2 (90–99%): 90% of cap → 1,223 CTX each; and

  • Tier 3 (100%): full cap → 1,359 CTX each.

Step-by-Step Calculation for Task Force Compensation

For full transparency, here is the exact breakdown of the maths used to determine the Task Force compensation cap, assuming a Keeper achieves a perfect 100% on-chain voting record over 6 months and a perfect Score 3 in off-chain activities.

1. The 6-Month On-chain Maximum

  • The original on-chain cap for 5 months was $408 per Keeper;

  • To find the monthly rate, divide by 5: $408 / 5 = $81.60 per month;

  • Multiply by the new 6-month timeline: $81.60 * 6 = $489.60; and

  • Convert to CTX at the $0.3602 spot price: $489.60 / $0.3602 = 1,359 CTX.

2. The Off-chain Maximum

  • The 1-month extension only applies to the on-chain activity, so the off-chain pool remains at its original fiat target of $3,498;

  • The baseline models 20 eligible Keepers. If all 20 qualify equally for the off-chain pool, the maximum cut per Keeper is: $3,498 / 20 = $174.90; and

  • Convert to CTX at the $0.3602 spot price: $174.90 / $0.3602 = 486 CTX.

3. The Total Cap

  • Max On-chain (1,359 CTX) + Max Off-chain (486 CTX) = 1,845 CTX; and

  • In fiat: $489.60 + $174.90 = $664.50.

Since the Task Force can’t out-earn a top-performing delegate, the Task Force budget must be capped at this exact figure.However, there’s something we must flag.

The original RFC explicitly states regarding off-chain rewards: “The cap per Keeper for each score will depend on the number of Keepers qualified for off-chain scores.” This means the 486 CTX off-chain cap is purely hypothetical because it assumes exactly 20 Keepers will participate and qualify.

But what happens if only 5 Keepers actually bother to complete the off-chain work? The off-chain pool ($3,498) divided by 5 Keepers yields $699.60 each. Therefore, the “Maximum Keeper Reward” rises to $1,189.20.

What we’re highlighting here is that ff the Task Force compensation is strictly defined as “not making more than the best-paid delegate” by hard-coding it in advance, we’re fixing it to a dynamic, retrospective variable that won’t be known until the programme concludes.

Looking forward to see the updated proposal up for a vote!

1 Like
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Hello again everyone

As I mentioned in my previous comment, I was already fully on board with the initial structure of the CKR Pilot, and this update only strengthens my support.

The 6-month extension and the revised calculations look solid. Thanks for putting it together, @SEEDGov. I agree with your note on the Task Force cap—a dynamic, retroactive calculation is way better than trying to hard-code it today.

Regarding rewards comparison, as other keepers suggested, we should remember to recognize staking rewards a tad more moving forward, since stakers are the ones who ultimately carry the risk edge.

I endorse this updated version and look forward to the vote.

Allez!

2 Likes
19

Thanks for working through this. I am on board with this pilot and supportive of moving to vote.

2 Likes
20

Thanks for the update to the proposal, SEEDGov.

We are comfortable with the changes and support this proposal moving to a vote.

2 Likes