Staking and Delegate Rewards

Ideas
1

Hello everybody!

I’m opening this new topic so we can all share ideas regarding the new CTX allocation that we will need to approve.

As you already know, the current rewards program will end on February 13th, which means we need to take care of a few things before that date:

  • Decide on the new amount of CTX to be transferred from the DAO treasury to cover staking rewards.

  • Determine how long we will extend the current program. Even though we are working with Aragon on the new platform and staking system, that version will not be live until late February, so we are considering a period of overlap between both programs to guarantee a smooth transition.

  • Since we will have two programs running simultaneously, we will need to split the CTX allocation between them.

Context:
In February of last year, approximately 101,000 CTX were allocated for rewards. That amount was intended to cover a full year, and close to 90,000 CTX were ultimately distributed.

I would like to start the discussion with an initial idea that we can build on:

Option 1

Extend the current program for three months, ending on May 13th. The reasoning is that this should give us enough time to transition from the current program to the Aragon-based version.

Additionally, we could split last year’s allocation (101,000 CTX) into four quarters to estimate how much would be needed to cover rewards for the February 13th – May 13th period. This would give us a useful benchmark that we can later adjust for the next quarter starting on May 14th.

To incentivize staking on the new platform, I suggest a 1:3 distribution ratio, meaning:

  • 1/3 of the CTX allocated would go to the current version

  • 2/3 would go to the new version

The numbers would look like this:

  • 101,000 CTX ÷ 4 = 25,250 CTX for rewards between February 13th and May 13th

  • Of that amount:

    • 8,416.6 CTX would go to the current version

    • 16,833.3 CTX would go to the new version

This approach should encourage stakers to migrate their assets from version 1 to version 2 as soon as the new platform is live.

The last topic we need to address is Keeper rewards. We are working on defining the best possible framework—one that promotes active participation across different channels (Discord, Forum, and voting) while also fairly rewarding Keepers based on their level of engagement.

We would love to hear ideas not only on how to track activity, but also on reward percentages, using the final staking reward numbers as a reference point.

Please share all your ideas in this thread so we can begin preparing the proposal.

Best,
Luis

6 Likes
2

Current staking program

While this is against our individual short term interest… did the DAO really get 90,000 CTX of value out of the Staking program last year? What would be the ramifications of a 25% reduction in the allocation for example? Could those funds be better used elsewhere to further the long term goals of the DAO?

Keeper rewards

I appreciate the intent here - thoughtful participation is a key pillar of DAOs and rewarding it certainly increases engagement. My concern here lies in inadvertently inviting rent-seeking behavior that drains the treasury without bringing any corresponding value. I’d be interested to see examples of systems that have leveraged rewards effectively, particularly if they are easy to implement. However, in my opinion, the team’s focus should remain on the Cryptex40 launch, not designing a Keeper Reward system.

In short, I’d like to see us exercise fiscal restraint and focus our funds on initiatives that bring value to the DAO.

3

Hi there; :nerd_face:

Thanks for opening this discussion and for sharing a concrete starting point.

On the current staking program:

the proposal generally makes sense to me, especially the intention to ensure an orderly transition. That said, it would be very helpful to also see an Option 2 for comparison. Even if Option 1 is the preferred path, having an alternative would add context and make the trade-offs more explicit. Right now, the numbers feel reasonable, but a bit underdetermined without a clear counterfactual.

Related to this, I think an important framing question for the thread is:

what specific behavior are we trying to reward, and why?

Making this explicit could help the DAO better evaluate whether the 1:3 split is the right incentive design, or simply a pragmatic approximation.

In general, I don’t see an issue with extending the program for a few months to allow for a smoother distribution and migration. My only strong point here is that this needs to be communicated very clearly to stakers, especially given that two programs will run in parallel. Clarity and predictability will matter more than small optimizations in allocation.

Regarding Keeper rewards,

I want to raise a note of caution. Rewarding “active participation across different channels (Discord, Forum, voting)” risks emphasizing voice and visibility over reasoned and valuable contributions. High activity does not necessarily correlate with better governance outcomes.

In Scroll, we are currently exploring a similar question through what we call Governance Contribution Recognition, and we are intentionally moving away from activity-based metrics toward value-based contributions, even if they are more subjective.

One possible direction for Cryptex could be a social reputation system, where DAO members recognize and signal when someone has made a meaningful contribution (for example, a well-argued forum post, a useful synthesis, or a proposal improvement). This shifts incentives toward quality, clarity, and long-term thinking, rather than volume of messages or channel presence.

Anyway, looking forward to continuing the discussion. :victory_hand:

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4

Thanks for starting this discussion @Lcedeno24

As a delegate, I want to share my view on the delegate program and its place in treasury priorities during this key moment.

The current setup has delivered strong results: the Dune dashboard shows total delegated CTX at ~1.6M, an all time high. This level of participation reflects holders responding to the open incentives by delegating CTX, which anyone can do under the same rules.

That delegation growth provides real, ongoing value to the DAO:

  • It secures governance decisions and keeper activity more robustly.
  • It supports broader engagement across ~20-30 active delegates/keepers
  • High turnout from consistent participants (e.g., strong voting rates from top delegators) keeps the system healthy and decentralized.

With the Aragon migration and Cryptex40 ahead, maintaining robust staking is especially important.

On treasury allocation: fiscal restraint makes sense overall, but it should be balanced.

Ops-related spends over the years have been materially larger than the amounts distributed through the staking program. The staking allocation feels disproportionately small relative to these, and scaling it back further (or keeping it flat) risks diluting the very holders who provide daily security, potentially reversing the current momentum when participation is at highs.

I believe we should prioritize sustaining (and ideally building on) this engagement for long term alignment. The program is about creating fair, rule-based incentives that encourage broad delegation, benefiting governance health.

For context, I’ve been advocating for higher allocations multiple times over the years. When we first increased the program, staked CTX was around 400k. Since then, it has grown steadily to the current ~1.6M. More CTX has been staked than has been distributed through the program, and the capital remains sticky. The incentives are clearly working to attract and retain participation.

Open to community thoughts on how to strike the right balance.

Looking forward to more input as we shape this!

5 Likes
5

Thanks for opening the discussion. Extending the program for three months seems reasonable to ensure a smooth transition to the Aragon system, as long as it’s clearly communicated to stakers.

The 1/3 split is a sensible initial incentive to encourage migration, though it would be helpful to compare it with at least one alternative.

Regarding delegate rewards, I agree they should prioritize value-based contributions rather than pure activity.

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6

Thanks for putting this up @Lcedeno24

Leaning towards option two. However, it would be great to understand the specific behaviours we are trying to reward, just as Alex Soto pointed out. This would help in deciding a suitable split as well as amount of CTX to be distributed.

QQ here, are there plans to sunset v1 eventually?

On keeper rewards, activity levels vs value alignment, we lean more towards combining both. We have some ideas on how we could achieve this and will mention them during the community call.

More broadly, we support @Mkatx5 take on focusing on initiatives that bring value to the DAO — from getting Cryptex40 off the ground to scaling/maintaining it. Right now, we believe this is the primary focus as it would also eventually lead to positive treasury growth.

7

Great to see this discussion in the forum, thanks for kicking it off @Lcedeno24 - here are our thoughts.

Staking

As @dnkta.eth pointed out, the programme has been effective enough to increase the amount of staked CTX from 400k to 1.6m, which makes showcases it’s good momentum. Going forward, we agree on extending as proposed. Since Aragon’s solutions may be in place by the end of February, three months gives us some buffer in case of delays on their side, something that none of us desires, but which may occur when developing such sensitive products.

That said, it totally makes sense to divide the rewards into quarters and allocate the first portion to Q1. However, questions arose on our end regarding the total number of CTX to be distributed through the staking programme and how they’re allocated between the two programmes that may coexist from March to mid-May.

As mentioned, last February 101,000 CTX were allocated to the staking programme, with ≈90,000 CTX actually being distributed. This means the APY, if the total rewards are 101,000 CTX and the staked amount remains 1,600,000 CTX, would be around 6.31% →

  • Annual rewards → 101,000 CTX

  • Total staked → 1,600,000 CTX

  • APY → (101,000 / 1,600,000) × 100 = 6.31%

While 6.31% sounds quite interesting in a downtrend market, we’re also talking about a volatile token. So a pertinent question is whether it’s worth increasing the rewards pool to increase the APY if the staked amount stays constant. At current staking levels, a pool of 128,000 CTX would push the APY to 8%. But, before answering that, we should ask:

  • Is it within Cryptex’s priorities to increase staking rewards to maintain or grow the amount of staked CTX?

  • Given the imminent launch of Cryptex40, is it worth dedicating more effort to the staking programme?

Once we tackle these questions, we’ll have our answer on whether to add 28,000 CTX to the staking pool.

The second point of concern is how and when staking rewards should be distributed. This is a twofold issue: how the first quarter’s allocation is split between the two programmes, and how rewards should be distributed in general.

For the first part, our concern is avoiding perverse incentives. If we follow the plan of 8,416.6 CTX for the current version and 16,833.3 CTX for the new version (which sounds logical to encourage transition), we need to clearly define how and when these rewards get distributed. What we want to avoid is a scenario where staying on the old version becomes more attractive after the new version launches.

For example, if rewards are distributed at the end of Q1, and 75% of staked CTX switches to the new version immediately, the remaining 25% would be better off staying put, because 100% of 8,416.6 CTX beats 25% of 16,833.3 CTX. That’s why defining the distribution mechanism matters even more than the allocation split itself.

A good starting point could be to calculate the first quarter’s daily allocation:

  • First quarter allocation: 25,250 CTX

  • Daily distribution: (25,250 CTX / 89 days) = 286 CTX per day

Then, we could start by allocating 100% of the daily 286 CTX to the old programme version. Once the new version launches, 75% of daily rewards go to the new version and 25% to the old one. This way, we would incentivise the transition without creating perverse incentives or leaving unaware stakers unrewarded. Lastly, rewards could be distributed at the end of each month or quarterly.

This reasoning brings us to the broader question of distribution timing. We believe that establishing a clear monthly or quarterly distribution schedule would give stakers predictability. Something like →

  • Annual rewards: 101,000 CTX

  • Monthly distribution reward: (101,000 CTX / 12) = 8,416.67 CTX

  • Quarterly distribution reward: (101,000 CTX / 4) = 25,250 CTX

This would give us a clear schedule and defined amounts.

To summarise, we leave the following question →

Is it worth increasing the staking pool by 28,000 CTX to reach 8% APY if staked amounts stay steady, or are we satisfied with 6.31%?

And we propose the following reward distribution schedules →

  • For the first quarter, distribute rewards monthly but allocate them daily. Start with 100% to the current programme, then switch to 75% for the new programme and 25% for the current one.

  • For the staking programme in general, distribute rewards monthly or quarterly for predictability.

Keeper rewards

When it comes to Keepers’ rewards, there’s a lot to unpack. As delegates in many DAOs, we have experienced the hard work that being a good delegate represents; therefore, we support a Keepers’ compensation programme.

Moving to the compensation programme itself, while we agree with @alexsotodigital concerns about quality versus quantity, we first need to define what we want to achieve.

From our perspective, the first goal should be - significantly - increasing delegate participation given the current metrics. Now that the DAO has redefined and strengthened its delegate set, increasing participation is the first step toward building a solid community where ideas that push Cryptex forward can be shared.

In this context, we envision a programme where delegate compensation is capped per period (monthly or quarterly). To reach the cap, delegates need to excel in both participation and quality. We could set a minimum threshold of voting and providing rationales on 80% of proposals during that period. Once a delegate hits this minimum, their compensation breaks down as →

  • 70% based on voting and rationales.

  • 30% based on the quality of their contributions ( comments or input on proposals or DAO-based initiatives).

Then, we could have a bonus for delegates whose proposals get approved and implemented. The percentages and categories are just starting points open to discussion, but we believe that they set a solid baseline for the conversation.

Once we rank delegate’s expectations, we can turn them into principles that guide Keepers’ contributions and avoid wasted efforts or misaligned proposals. That said, if something falls outside these principles but brings real value to Cryptex, we should stay open-minded enough to recognise those contributions for what they’re worth.

As we mentioned before, these are just our initial thoughts to keep both conversations moving. Looking forward to discussing ideas to fine-tune both programmes and achieve the best outcomes for Cryptex.

3 Likes
8

Hey everyone,

Wanted to add a few more thoughts to this discussion.

First, some context on current state: the APR right now sits at ~13% (see Cryptex Finance ).
Something worth flagging is that some wallets delegating directly through Tally aren’t receiving staking rewards. This is an edge case we should definitely address in the v2 design.

Ideally the new system rewards everyone who is delegating, regardless of how they’re doing it.

On Keeper rewards, I’m aligned with SeedGov here. Since this is a new component being introduced to the system, I think there’s a strong case for making the rewards meaningful enough for everyone to drive real participation. My preference would be to see total rewards split between CTX stakers and delegates, gives both groups skin in the game and creates better alignment across the ecosystem.

Would love to hear more concrete details on how the new system will actually work mechanically. Also curious if there’s room for the community to help shape the final design before it goes live. Looking forward to the community call discussion.

2 Likes
9

Thanks @Lcedeno24 for bringing this forward and for the great starting thoughts. Several have already chimed in so I’ll add my thoughts and tap into a bit of what has already come up.

On staking, I agree with @SEEDGov that the 66/33% split suggested in the original post could lead to a situation where we inadvertently incentivize a portion of stakers to remain on the current version. In my opinion even the updated 75/25% split starting from date of launch may do that. Either way, at the end of the quarter, there would be stakers on the old version earning rewards and not willing to move. Would it instead be possible to offer just a short window where parallel rewards are offered on both versions and then cut over exclusively to rewards on the new?

Example: Let’s consider 2k CTX emissions per week on each “rewards active” version. But only let the old version be “rewards active” until 2 weeks after the new version activates. For sake of illustration, lets say the new version activates at the beginning of week 3 (but it wouldn’t actually change the approach regardless of when it happens during the quarter):

  • Week 1-2: 2k CTX rewards per week to old version only.
  • Week 3-4: 2k CTX rewards per week to old version AND 2k CTX rewards per week to new version.
  • Week 5-13: 2k CTX rewards per week to new version only.

In this example, total rewards would be 30k over the entire quarter and stakers would be incentivized to quickly migrate to the new version (staying at most 2 weeks on the old). We’d want to communicate well in advance so stakers could all be aware that a new version is coming and that old version rewards will cease quickly thereafter so prompt action is advised. We’d also have to be willing to accept that some stakers may not check in often enough to move before the old version rewards cease and may feel some frustration. Seems it may be worth it in order to get quickly settled on the new platform. Open to other ways to accomplish this without having parallel rewards for the remainder of the quarter.

On keeper rewards I agree with @dnkta.eth and others who have indicated support for keepers to share in the total rewards. As for how to determine eligibility, I resonate with @alexsotodigital warnings of encouraging quantity over quality if we put too heavy a focus on “activity”. I like @SEEDGov idea of a threshold on voting activity to ensure we are targeting keepers that are actively governing. But beyond that type of threshold, I’m not sure how to promote quality of contributions. I’m quite hesitant of any subjective measure – who would be able to fairly rate/rank the quality or value of keepers’ contributions without being biased by their positions (or even their communication styles)? I think if keepers are showing up and sharing their thoughts and voting, that’s what we want – even if the ideas are unconventional, even if the presentation isn’t polished, even if the majority disagrees.

I’m excited to see all the participation on this topic – feels quite encouraging for the future. I appreciate the opportunity to weigh in and look forward to reaching solutions together.

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For context, V1 of Staking works as a Synthethix staking contract, so rewards are allocated by block, and the staker can claim whenever they want. It could generate incentives for people to not migrate, as the fewer people on V1, the more rewards you can earn (you would get a major share of the remaining CTX)

For V2, a bi-weekly reward Distribution is suggested. As V2 is using Aragon contracts, there are additional variables we can work with, for example, a Voting Multiplier (which will increase rewards), a cooldown period, a min loc,k, and tax for removing early.

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11

Thank you all for your participating in the discussion, I want to share a summary of the comments and a few thing in which there seems to be consensus as well as some that need to be discussed a little more.

Summary of Delegate Feedback – Staking & Keeper Rewards

(Areas of Alignment & Open Questions)

Over the past few days, delegates have begun sharing feedback on the upcoming CTX allocation for staking rewards and the potential introduction of Keeper rewards. Below is a structured summary of the main points discussed so far, highlighting areas of alignment as well as topics where opinions differ and further discussion is needed.

:blue_circle: Areas of Alignment / Emerging Consensus

1. Need for a transition period

There is general agreement that the current staking program should not end abruptly. A transition or overlap period is seen as necessary to ensure continuity for stakers while the new Aragon-based staking system is finalized and launched.

2. Importance of treasury sustainability

Delegates broadly agree that CTX allocations for rewards should be evaluated through the lens of long-term DAO sustainability, rather than assuming that past allocations should automatically be repeated.

3. Incentives should create real value

There is shared concern that both staking rewards and any potential Keeper rewards must generate measurable value for the DAO, rather than existing purely as passive or entitlement-based incentives.

:orange_circle: Points of Divergence / Active Discussion

1. Size of the staking rewards allocation

  • One perspective supports using last year’s allocation (~101,000 CTX annually) as a benchmark and prorating it for a short extension period to maintain continuity and predictability.

  • Another perspective questions whether the DAO received sufficient value from distributing ~90,000 CTX last year and suggests exploring a reduced allocation (e.g. a 25% cut), with excess funds potentially redirected toward higher-impact initiatives.

This raises the broader question of how success and ROI of the staking program should be measured.

2. Incentivizing migration to the new staking system

  • The proposed 1:3 distribution ratio (favoring the new platform once live) is intended to encourage early migration and adoption.

  • While the logic of incentivizing migration is clear, discussion is still open on whether this ratio is optimal or if alternative mechanisms could achieve the same goal with fewer emissions.

3. Keeper rewards framework

  • There is alignment that thoughtful participation (voting, forum engagement, Discord activity) is important for DAO health.

  • However, concerns were raised around:

    • Potential rent-seeking behavior

    • Increased complexity and treasury drain

    • Whether this is the right time to design and implement such a system

One view suggests that DAO focus and resources may be better allocated toward core priorities (such as the Cryptex40 launch), rather than introducing a new incentive framework prematurely.

:compass: Key Open Questions to Resolve

Based on the discussion so far, the following topics require further clarity and alignment:

  1. What is the appropriate CTX allocation for staking rewards during the transition period?

  2. Should last year’s allocation be treated as a baseline, or should reductions be actively explored?

  3. Is the proposed 1:3 split the best mechanism to incentivize migration to the new staking system?

  4. Should Keeper rewards be:

    • Implemented now

    • Deferred until after major product milestones

    • Or explored in a minimal / experimental form?

  5. How should value and impact of both staking and Keeper rewards be measured going forward?

Let’s keep the conversation going, I think we are in a better position now and we can start narrowing are options down in order to have a draft of what the actual proposal would look like.

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12

Hi everyone, Curia here. Thanks @Lcedeno24 for kickstarting this and summarizing the discussion so far. We’re joining the thread a bit late, but we’ve been catching up on the progress. We really like the direction this is heading, especially the discussion on the mechanics of the V1-to-V2 transition.

Here’s our take:

Staking & Migration

We’re echoing @SEEDGov ‘s suggestion on the reward split model. It’s likely more effective way to handle the transition without creating an “incentive trap.” As @dnkta.eth mentioned, participation is at an all-time high right now, so our main priority should be protecting that momentum while we move.

If we were to keep the status quo, we’d risk people “camping” on V1; as others leave for V2, the individual yield for those staying behind could actually spike, making them less likely to move. Shifting the allocation to favor V2 the moment the Aragon staking contract goes live, we make migrating the obvious choice. It feels like the fairest way to drive a fast, orderly transition while ensuring the new platform gains momentum immediately.

We believe the suggestion above is a great starting point.

Keeper Reward Framework

We agree that the system should avoid incentivizing “noise” over value, and we believe the DAO should look into some form of Reputation system. Building on the ideas shared by @alexsotodigital, @SEEDGov, and others, we could define what “quality” or an “active” delegate really looks like. This could include a baseline percentage of voting participation paired with meaningful contributions on the forum or Discord, along with other aligned behaviors we want to promote (e.g., holding or staking CTX or Cryptex’s Indices).

We’re actually working on a conceptual framework for this right now, which is similar to the DRS we built for the Obol Collective. The idea is to find a measurable way to encourage stakers to delegate to these “Active” participants, perhaps by gating or weighting rewards based on that status (both Keeper & Staker rewards). If stakers know their rewards depend on picking a solid, quality delegate, it turns the community’s reputation into the real driver for governance quality.

Regarding the timing, we believe the V2 transition is the ideal window. Since stakers will already be moving their assets and re-establishing their delegation on the new platform, it’s a natural “clean slate.” It forces a healthy re-evaluation, giving delegators/stakers a reason to actually check if their chosen delegate is active and aligned before they stake to the new contract.

We’d love to open a discussion on what metrics the Cryptex community actually values in a “Keeper.” We have a rough draft of a scoring logic ready, but we’d prefer to share it as a starting point for us all to iterate on and build together. We’ll post those initial thoughts soon on another thread to see where everyone stands.

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13

Hi there; :nerd_face:

Thanks everyone for the thoughtful inputs so far. :waving_hand:
I want to build on a few points raised by others, specifically around the Keeper Reward Framework and how we think about delegate value and rewards.

I strongly agree with this framing. The core challenge here is not whether we reward delegates, but how explicitly we define what “value creation” looks like in Cryptex.

When value is unclear, the safest strategy for contributors becomes visible participation: posting, reacting, and staying present everywhere out of fear of not being recognized. Clear definitions reduce that uncertainty and align effort with outcomes the protocol actually needs.

I agree with @SEEDGov that proposal forming is one of the clearest signals of value creation, moving the protocol forward in a tangible way. However, I would suggest differentiating (and quantifying differently) between:

a) Drafting proposals that are eventually approved and implemented
a.k.a. starting a proposal from scratch following a pre-established format (after having generated collective sense-making).

b) Raising a reasoned ‘objection’ that improves a proposal
I intentionally use the term objection (in the sense of consent-based decision-making) rather than a generic comment. The idea is to formalize risk signaling and make it less subjective. A valid objection would be one that clearly surfaces a risk or limitation and helps refine a proposal that is later approved and implemented. This shifts incentives from “having an opinion” to protecting the protocol. (More of this below)

c) Delivering a verifiable key result
If Cryptex defines specific bounties or key outcomes (for example, onboarding new long-term CTX holders who delegate), delegates could go through a verification process to attribute that impact and be rewarded accordingly. This ties compensation to outcomes, not just process.

This concern is valid. Subjectivity can easily introduce bias. That said, structure can reduce subjectivity without eliminating judgment altogether.

For example, a common concern is: who decides whether an objection is actually valid?

In methodologies like Holacracy, this is addressed through a facilitator role. The facilitator is a neutral actor elected by the group whose responsibility is not to agree or disagree, but to test whether the objection meets a predefined set of criteria. An objection is considered valid only if it meets all of the following:

  1. It would reduce the group’s capacity to enact its purpose or accountabilities.
  2. It would limit the objector’s ability to fulfill their own role’s purpose or accountabilities.
  3. The concern would not already exist without the proposal (it introduces a new tension).
  4. The proposal would necessarily cause that harm, or there would not be enough time to adapt before significant damage occurs.

This makes objections binary (yes/no), testable, and less dependent on rhetoric or communication style.

A framework like the one above does not remove human discretion, but it constrains it. Collective scrutiny also helps: if an objection is rejected despite clearly meeting the criteria (or accepted without meeting them), that tension becomes visible and contestable.

On reward weighting

Building on @SEEDGov , I would keep the idea of setting “a minimum threshold of voting and providing rationales on 80% of proposals during that period” but would also personally invert the suggested weights:

  • 30% based on voting participation and published rationales.

  • 70% based on demonstrated quality of contributions (proposal drafts, validated objections, verified outcomes, meaningful input on DAO initiatives).

Flipping the ratio changes the posture of the delegate. It rewards proactive contribution (adding concrete value) rather than passive representation. It is a harder standard and it places more responsibility on delegates to “earn” their compensation, but I believe it better protects the protocol in the long run because it reduces the risk of rent-seeking behavior.

On the Open Questions to Resolve:

I would strongly lean toward the third option: a minimal, explicitly experimental implementation.

This is not a question that will become materially clearer simply by waiting for more product-market fit. Governance incentives operate in complex systems, and in complex systems, clarity rarely arrives in advance. It emerges through interaction.

Deferring this entirely assumes that future scale or maturity will somehow reveal the “right” model. In practice, what often happens is the opposite: organizational debt accumulates, expectations harden, and the cost of changing incentives later becomes higher and more politically difficult.

A small, time-bounded experiment allows the DAO to:

  • Observe real behaviors instead of hypothesizing them.
  • Test assumptions about incentives with limited downside.
  • Adjust quickly before norms and entitlements set in.

If we do go down the experimental route, I think it’s important not to oversimplify out of fear of complexity. The underlying question is already complex:

Any honest answer to that will necessarily include qualitative judgment. The goal should not be to eliminate judgment, but to structure it. Clear criteria, defined roles and collective scrutiny can make qualitative assessment legible, contestable, and improvable over time.

An experimental Keeper rewards framework is a learning mechanism for how Cryptex understands, recognizes, and protects value creation in its governance system. That learning is more likely to come from a well-designed experiment than from waiting for a level of certainty that never fully arrives.

:victory_hand:

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