[RFC] Cryptex Keepers Rewards (CKR) - Season 2

Proposals
1

Summary

The present RFC proposes Season 2 of the Cryptex Keepers Rewards program, covering governance contributions from July to December 2026. It follows the approval of CIP-6 and the Season 1 results.

Season 1 was the pilot. Season 2 keeps the core of the pilot: a 70/30 on-chain / off-chain split, a per-Keeper on-chain cap, participation tiers with an 80% floor, CIP votes only, a 0–3 off-chain score, and a Task Force of one Keeper plus one unpaid Foundation member. It updates the amounts and changes two things: the off-chain pool no longer has to be fully distributed, and a combined per-Keeper cap now applies across both pools.

To that end, a total of 50,000 CTX is contemplated for Keeper rewards this season, noting that each CTX that is not earned on-chain or not allocated off-chain is returned to the treasury. Also, a total of 28,156 CTX is allocated to the Task Force to continue fulfilling the monitoring and execution of CKR while also developing a governance analytics site in order to better serve the Cryptex ecosystem.

It is worth mentioning that Season 1 left 20,113 CTX unused, therefore leaving those funds available to be rolled into Season 2, alleviating the disbursement for the DAO.

Motivation

CKR remains a complementary path to staking rewards: it incentivises Keepers for securing CIP votes and for the off-chain work that voting does not capture. Season 1 set the baseline. Season 2 should iterate on that baseline without rebuilding the program.

As per the parameters, we are keeping the on-chain cap. Without one, a small set of voters could drain the voting pool. Season 1 served as the participation baseline where 6 eligible Keepers met the requirements; in this iteration, we expect that number to increase reasonably, making it necessary to determine a limit for this source of rewards. Season 1 fully distributed the off-chain pool, rewarding efforts that are not captured on-chain but still add to an active DAO and community. Season 2 will keep the 0–3 score as the differential between Keepers.

A combined per-Keeper 7,500 CTX (≈3,000$ at 0.40) is added across both pools, so no single Keeper can take an outsized share, and discretion cannot concentrate the whole off-chain pool on one or two wallets. That mark is a ceiling, not a target for every selected Keeper. High on-chain participation plus Score 3 is what can reach it.

The CKR Season 2 program

The window is 1 July 2026 – 31 December 2026.

On-chain activity is voting on CIPs, leaving Optimistic / Fast Track CIPX votes aside for calculation.

Off-chain activity shall be composed of contributions outside of voting. Those activities remain:

  1. Providing feedback to RFCs that gets reflected in the proposal’s final version.

  2. Providing feedback in an ongoing initiative that is adopted by its operators.

  3. Contributing to Cryptex social media efforts as per the set guidelines.

The Task Force remains one Keeper and one Foundation member in order to ensure proper alignment of the efforts and have both perspectives in the given evaluation process. The Foundation member is unpaid for this task.

In addition, the Task Force will develop a public-facing governance analytics site in order to increase transparency, participation, and accountability in Cryptex governance by making governance activity easier to understand and analyze. A dedicated analytics site would provide delegates, token holders, and contributors with accessible, reliable data to better evaluate proposals, voting behaviour, participation, and broader governance trends, ultimately enabling more informed and data-driven decision-making. This should become specially useful to evaluate the Governance 2.0 proposal.

The required budget is to cover:

  • Development: Engineering and implementation.

  • Infrastructure: Hosting, APIs, and data services.

  • Design & Maintenance: UX, updates, and ongoing support.

Proposed split

Therefore, we consider that the CKR CTX allocation should remain weighted: having 70% of the Keeper envelope based on on-chain activity and 30% based on off-chain contributions. In order to reflect different ranges of participation, we are suggesting 3 tiers for each of the splits.

1. On-chain activity (70% weight)

For the purpose of the CIP, on-chain activity is understood as voting on CIPs. Each Keeper is subject to a seasonal cap of 1,750 CTX (≈ $700 at $0.40). Three tiers shall reflect the Keepers’ participation rate against that cap. The purpose of the tiered approach is to recognize perfect participation while also setting a strong baseline in order to reach rewards.

Below 80% → 0 CTX.

Tier 1 (80–89%) → 80% of cap → 1,400 CTX.

Tier 2 (90–99%) → 90% of cap → 1,575 CTX.

Tier 3 (100%) → full cap → 1,750 CTX.

2. Off-chain activity (30% weight)

Off-chain activity shall be composed of contributions outside of voting, as listed above.

To this end, the following tiers are proposed as per a scoring system:

Score 0 → 0 CTX.

Score 1 → minor contribution.

Score 2 → solid contribution.

Score 3 → major contribution.

Score 0 does not share the pool. The score ranks a Keeper’s off-chain work and guides the Task Force when it sets each allocation, with a higher score meriting a larger share. The Task Force decides how much of the off-chain pool to allocate and to whom, bounded by the 15,000 CTX pool and the 7,500 CTX combined per-Keeper cap (≈ $3,000). It does not have to spend the full pool, and anything it does not allocate returns to the treasury..

Although not desirable, Keepers below 80% on-chain can still receive off-chain rewards, still subject to the 7,500 CTX combined ceiling. To the end of assigning the scores as well as monitoring the overall execution of the program, the Task Force remains one Keeper and one Foundation member, as in Season 1.

CKR Parameters

Given Season 1 turnout (6 eligible on-chain) and the fact that rewards are now public, we’d expect participation to rise. As an illustration for budgeting, the scenario below models 12 Keepers clearing the 80% bar. It is not a cap on how many can qualify. It is worth mentioning that each CTX that is not distributed is returned to the treasury (i.e. if Keepers do not reach the required Tiers to reach the full cap, or if the Task Force does not allocate the full off-chain pool).

USD figures below are illustrative at $0.40.

Breakdown

Pools

Keeper envelope: 50,000 CTX (≈ $20,000).

On-chain pool: 35,000 CTX (≈ $14,000).

Off-chain pool: up to 15,000 CTX (≈ $6,000).

Season 1 remainder: 20,113 CTX (≈ $8,045)

Task Force: 28,156 CTX (≈ $11,262)

New treasury request: 58,043 CTX (≈ $23,217). This is the 78,156 CTX total program value (50,000 Keeper envelope + 28,156 Task Force) less the 20,113 CTX rolled over from Season 1.

On-chain Tiers

On-chain cap/Keeper: 1,750 CTX (≈ $700). This is the seasonal cap described above, not a per-vote amount.

Implied per vote if 7 CIPs and 100% participation: 250 CTX (`1,750 / 7`). There is no separate per-vote cap.

The on-chain pool covers up to 20 Keepers at the full 1,750 cap. Beyond that, on-chain draws from the 50,000 envelope.

Tier 1 (80–89%) → 80% of cap → 1,400 CTX each.

Tier 2 (90–99%) → 90% of cap → 1,575 CTX each.

Tier 3 (100%) → full cap → 1,750 CTX each.

Expected on-chain if 12 Keepers reach 100%: 21,000 CTX (≈ $8,400). The remaining 14,000 CTX of the on-chain pool returns to the treasury.

Each CTX that is not distributed is returned to the treasury. For instance, if Keepers are in Tier 1 or Tier 2, the remaining portion of their cap will be returned to the treasury.

If more than 12 Keepers clear 80%, every eligible Keeper is paid their tier of the cap. We do not pro-rate. If on-chain would exceed the 50,000 CTX Keeper envelope, on-chain is paid first, and off-chain shrinks.

Off-chain Scores

Score 0 → 0 CTX.

Score 1 → 1 weight.

Score 2 → 2 weights.

Score 3 → 3 weights.

Off-chain pool: up to 15,000 CTX (≈ $6,000). Full distribution is not required.

Combined clip: on-chain + off-chain cannot exceed 7,500 CTX (≈ $3,000). A Keeper at the 1,750 CTX on-chain cap has 5,750 CTX of room under the clip. That residual is not automatically paid.

Each CTX that is not allocated by the Task Force is returned to the treasury.

Looking forward to comments from Keepers. If this gathers the required endorsements, it should move to a vote as the successor to CIP-6!

2 Likes
2

Thanks to SEEDGov for putting together the Season 2 RFC and detailing the Season 1 results.

While I appreciate the initiative to build a dedicated governance analytics site, and think it’s a great idea in principle, I believe the DAO’s capital is currently much better allocated toward ensuring a successful $BAGZ launch.

Reflecting on Season 1, my personal observation is that the pilot had minimal incremental impact above and beyond natural, organic governance participation:

  • Participation vs. Projections: The original CKR proposal estimated a baseline of ~20 eligible Keepers, but only 6 ended up meeting the minimum requirements, all of whom were already consistently active prior to the program.

  • Quorum & Proposal Success: The 400k CTX quorum threshold was successfully reached on every CIP regardless of CKR incentives. The DAO was not struggling to pass proposals before the pilot, so the marginal value generated by paying 6 active participants versus relying on organic participation is genuinely difficult to isolate or justify.

Because of this, I’m not convinced of the need to continue the pilot program in its current form. If the DAO does decide to proceed with Season 2, I would like to see a clearer, data-driven explanation of what specific incremental value CKR delivers beyond our baseline organic state.

If the community decides to move forward with Season 2, I recommend the following amendments:

  1. Defer the Governance Analytics Site: Defer development and infrastructure costs until next year, keeping core focus and treasury resources aligned with the $BAGZ rollout.

  2. Reduce the Task Force Budget: Scale the Task Force budget back down to Season 1 levels or lower to reflect a smaller operational scope without the custom site development.

  3. Lower the Per-Keeper Combined Cap: Reduce the maximum combined cap per Keeper from 7,500 CTX down to 2,000 CTX to ensure capital efficiency and prevent disproportionate payouts.

Looking forward to hearing thoughts on how we can best align treasury expenditures with our current top strategic priorities.

3

Thanks @SEEDGov for the detailed RFC, and @Mkatx5 for the pushback.

On the structural changes: the combined per-Keeper cap and making off-chain distribution optional (rather than forcing the full 15,000 CTX out the door) are genuine improvements over Season 1. Returning unearned/unallocated CTX to treasury by default is the right posture for an incentive program.

On evidence of impact: I share Mkatx5’s concern here. The RFC gives us Season 1’s participation numbers (6 eligible Keepers vs. ~20 projected) but doesn’t really make the case for what CKR added on the margin. Quorum was met on every CIP regardless of the incentive, so before renewing, it would help to see something like: did CKR retain Keepers who would’ve otherwise dropped off, improve vote quality/timeliness, or bring in anyone genuinely new? If it’s mainly rewarding already-active participants, that’s not necessarily wasted spend (retention has value), but the RFC should say that’s the goal explicitly rather than leave it to inference.

On the analytics site: I’d suggest splitting this out from the rewards renewal entirely. It’s a good idea on its own merits, but bundling a ~28k CTX Task Force budget increase (with new dev/infra/design scope) into a CKR renewal vote makes it harder to evaluate either piece cleanly. Let the DAO vote on the site as its own proposal, with its own budget justification and timeline.

On the reward cap: one thing worth flagging, the 7,500 CTX combined cap is denominated in CTX, with the $3,000 figure just an illustrative conversion at the price of $0.40. If CTX appreciates meaningfully over the six-month window, the dollar cost of the program per Keeper rises with it if uncapped. I’m not suggesting a switch to US dollar denomination (that just trades dollar-cost risk for dilution risk if price falls instead), but a collar, e.g., “7,500 CTX, capped at $X equivalent” would give the treasury more predictability without introducing that trade-off.

Summary: supportive of the direction, but I’d want:
(1) a short impact/counterfactual section.
(2) the analytics site as a standalone proposal.
(3) Some cap protection against price upside, before this goes to a vote.

4

Thanks @SEEDGov for putting Season 2 together, and to the Task Force for administering Season 1 and carrying those learnings into this next iteration.

DAOplomats is broadly supportive of Season 2 moving forward. A few adjustments we’d like to see incorporated first:

Per-Keeper Combined Cap
7,500 CTX (~$3,000) across both pools is too high for a single Keeper in what’s still an early-stage program. We’d propose cutting it to 3,750 CTX (~$1,500) — 50% of the current figure. That’s still enough to properly reward a Keeper who votes at 100% and lands a top off-chain score, without letting one or two wallets absorb an outsized share of the envelope.

Eligibility
We support loosening eligibility so Keepers below the 80% on-chain threshold can still earn off-chain rewards, subject to the combined cap. On-chain voting and off-chain contribution measure different kinds of work, and off-chain effort shouldn’t be zeroed out because a Keeper’s voting record fell short in a given season.

Governance Analytics Site
We’d rather defer this piece. Treasury and Task Force attention are better spent making sure $BAGZ launches successfully right now. Once BAGZ is live, a governance dashboard will have real post-launch activity to track and will land with more relevance than if it’s built pre-emptively.

Task Force Compensation
Consistent with the approach the DAO landed on in Season 1, we’d like Task Force pay capped at whatever the highest combined on-chain + off-chain reward any single Keeper actually earns — calculated at the end of the season rather than fixed up front. That’s the exact issue SEEDGov flagged during Season 1: pre-setting the number ties it to a hypothetical turnout that may not match what actually happens. Determining it retrospectively keeps Task Force pay proportionate to real results.

Together with deferring the dashboard, this should bring the Task Force allocation down well below the proposed 28,156 CTX, closer to the modest, capped structure Season 1 ended up with.

Glad to see the program iterating on real Season 1 data rather than being rebuilt from scratch — happy to discuss any of the above further.

1 Like
5

Thanks @SEEDGov for the proposal. Appreciate the other keepers who already responded. I’m actually very aligned with most of the other comments here, and I think @DAOplomats writeup aligns with my thoughts particularly well.

Governance Analytics Site - Agree this should be split out and considered separately as @lucrica suggested. I tend to agree with @Mkatx5 and @DAOplomats that it isn’t a priority right now but carving into its own proposal would allow it to receive the appropriate consideration from the whole community without complicating CKR.

Overall Reward Allocation - Consistent with my comments on the other proposal for staking rewards, I think anything we can do to continue these reward programs while reducing allocations to preserve treasury is prudent. I think @Mkatx5 and @lucrica questions about impact of the program are fair, but I feel the way the rewards are designed (specifically the caps) prevent us from over-rewarding a small group and will incentivize continued delegate growth and participation and we should try to keep this program going. That said, I would like to see us make the following reductions:

Reward Cap - Keepers - First of all, I am glad that this proposal modified by @SEEDGov so that the off chain pool no longer must be fully distributed – bravo! Re:@lucrica idea, I would keep the rewards denominated in CTX (not try to cap based on dollar equivalent) – it seems sufficient to simply alter reward pools/caps each seasons if price levels have changed significantly enough to warrant it, I don’t think we should try to manage that within a season. I am 100% onboard with @DAOplomats suggestion to cut the combined limit in half from the proposed level. 3750 CTX seems sufficient to incentivize participation and will allow more funds to be returned (or carried forward) if we continue to have a smaller number of active governance participants. This reduced max would actually only be possible from 1750 on chain, 2000 off chain (which is already skewed toward off chain for what was originally intended to be a ~70/30 allocation split - and that skew would get even more pronounced at the originally proposed 7500 cap).

Reward Cap - Task Force - I agree that capping this at the highest combined Keeper reward as in Season 1 is an appropriate way to compensate. If there are other value-add activities that task force members would like to take up and would warrant compensation, those can and should be addressed separately (as with the governance site comments above), not rolled into general task force compensation.

On Chain Expectation - I’m somewhat ambivalent about eligibility for off-chain rewards without sufficient on-chain participation. While there’s no doubt the type of engagement off-chain rewards are incentivizing is valuable, at the end of the day governance only becomes effective thru voting. If someone ONLY participates in off chain activities and doesn’t participate in formal governance, should they earn ~2k CTX for that participation? If a developer only contributes code that never gets committed, should they be compensated? I’m willing to try this as proposed for season 2, but seems like a potential item to revisit in the future.

Thanks again to everyone who contributed to the proposal and its feedback!

6

Hello everyone,

​Thanks @SEEDGov for putting this together.

​In line with maintaining a prudent approach to treasury management, I have no opposition to scaling down overall reward allocations to safeguard our runway. I also agree that rewards should remain strictly CTX-denominated, aligning with @lucrica’s point on avoiding in-season price complexity.

​Taking @DesertDwelr’s observation on actual pool dynamics into account, shifting to a 60/40 reward weighting (with 40% allocated on-chain) could better reflect off-chain efforts while preserving a strong baseline for voting participation.

​While I am completely open to tuning these parameters in the future as we collect more data, maintaining momentum is key right now. I endorse.

​Allez!

​Luis F.

7

So if the purpose behind the pilot is to increase the amount of delegates, besides determining the out put amounts per subject, maybe there should be a small focus on advertising?

As far as the rewards, I do support cutting them down to 3750 ctx cap, however I do believe those who did not vote, should receive a small share. The objective if this program is to boost delegates to vote/propose as needed, if another reward program is created for marketing/advertisers, that’s where off chain work can be more helpful and compensated but I think we should highlight the necessity of advertising to grow the DAO.. right now we’re the same 18 delegates as 6 months ago, we need to find another way to notify larger masses.

I think with reward amount cut by 50%, 25% can be reallocated to marketers/advertisers and the remaining 25% back to treasury.. without marketing, how will we draw in others?

8

Supportive of this moving forward. The tiered structure and per-Keeper caps are a solid improvement from Season 1 and the treasury return mechanism for unallocated CTX is the right move.

I echo @DAOplomats and @DesertDwelr on bringing the per-Keeper cap down to 3,750 CTX. Agree with @lucrica that some impact data from Season 1 would
strengthen the case, but I don’t think the absence should block renewal.

On the analytics site: splitting it into its own proposal makes sense. Keeps evaluation clean and lets us scope it properly after $BAGZ launch rather than bundling it in here.

In favor of moving to a vote with the reduced cap.

9

Hi everyone!

Really appreciate the thoughtful feedback and perspectives that were brought to this discussion. We now have a pretty clear picture of the different viewpoints and considerations at play, which should help us move forward with greater clarity and alignment.

One thing that we believe is worth pointing out is that Season 1 constituted a pilot program where the 20 estimated Keepers was a baseline, not a target. In that sense, the caps worked as intended and a significant portion of the budget was returned to the treasury. Both the prior and current caps, alongside the removal of having to fully distribute the off chain pool are measures that precisely aim to look after the treasury’s health.

While true that quorum was achieved before the pilot, it can be seen that at times the reliance was on a handful of Keepers. During the pilot, there has been an increase in unique voters which further sustain the assurance of quorum and governance. That, alongside the recognition of that activity in terms of Keeper retention which shows both on-chain and off-chain, are motivation already for this second season.

This, among many other things is what we aim to showcase within the analytics site. Something that we believe is not only useful but necessary in order to get the full picture of what these programs.

Participation

In regards to the onchain participation rates, we do think that the current 80% reflects a reasonable expectation given the current governance activity and the Governance 2.0 framework, while the tiered approach properly recognizes those above that mark.

As per offchain, @DAOplomats and @DesertDwelr bring up an interesting point that we’ve discussed ourselves given the very different nature of both contributions so taking the chance to share our view. The objective will always be to aim for on-chain participation but the struggles are widely known on why that’s challenging to achieve, which is an industry-wide issue. Hopefully that reverts over time but it’ll certainly be a gradual process.

In that sense, there’s a natural off-chain component of governance activity that not only exists but is also an avenue not only for increasing on-chain participation,but for sustaining it. As mentioned, some of those aspects go over accountability, ecosystem and business development, community signaling, advertising (as @Justmy2Satoshis28 mentioned) , among others. We also agree on keeping the item for this second season and further opening the discussion in the next months.

Rewards
Taking the feedback, we’ll be proposing a combined, per-keeper reward cap of 3,750 CTX, effectively translating into 2,000 CTX as the max reward from the offchain pool. To clarify, the motivation behind having a USD reference is precisely providing previsibility to the activity, mitigating volatility as much as possible and an overall common practice in order to avoid including buffers or other mechanisms.

In the case price levels vary significantly during the season, a new RFC can be submitted in order to re-assess the reward structure in order to match the expectations at the time.

Appreciate again the comments and feedback!

10

Thanks all for the engagement on this point specifically — a few of you (@DAOplomats @DesertDwelr ) proposed capping Task Force pay at whatever the single highest combined Keeper reward turns out to be, set retroactively at season end. I want to push back on that mechanism, and lay out why the 28,156 CTX figure is structured the way it is.

Task Force compensation here covers three distinct things, not one:

  1. Uncompensated keeper work. Outside this program, Seed Gov participates in Cryptex governance exactly like any other Keeper — voting, endorsing, drafting, engaging on proposals. But because Seed administers CKR, none of that work is eligible for CKR rewards. Every other active Keeper is being paid for that category of work; Seed is doing the same work and isn’t.

  2. Program administration. Running CKR is a distinct job from being a rewarded participant in it: structuring the proposal, building and maintaining the scoring/payment sheets, running the calculations each cycle, and handling the individual disputes and questions that follow every distribution. That’s ongoing operational labor, independent of how many Keepers qualify or what any one of them earns.

  3. Analytics site development. Design, infra, and dev cost, scoped as its own deliverable.

Tying Task Force pay to the top Keeper’s outcome conflates these with a fourth, unrelated thing: how well other people happen to vote this season. Keeper rewards measure Keeper participation; they aren’t a proxy for the cost of running the program or building the site. A structure where Seed’s compensation rises or falls based on turnout it doesn’t control isn’t more disciplined than a fixed number — it’s just an arbitrary one.

On splitting out the analytics site

Several of you (@lucrica @DesertDwelr @Mkatx5 suggested spinning the dashboard into its own proposal. I’d keep it here, and I’d push back on treating it as deferrable at all.

We already treat governance as something worth paying for: we pay stakers for securing the network, we pay Keepers for voting and off-chain contribution, and we’ve invested directly in Aragon to run a genuinely community-governed process on a new UI. None of that spend is “nice to have” — it’s the cost of running governance properly, the same category as what we pay marketing, legal, or dev. Analytics is the missing piece of that same picture, not an add-on to it.

Considering the different UIs, systems and moving pieces along the years, we are looking forward to having a single source of truth in the matter and have a full historical and ongoing understanding of how governance performs and properly addressing the impact of the made choices, making the dedicated site exactly for the support we’re looking for, more so considering what we have ahead of us.

Alongside up-to-date participation and VP metrics, delegation patterns and how CTX flows through staking and voting, we also want to leverage Keepers activity in the site, making it easier not only for Keepers to participate but also to drive full accountability across the board.

Deferring it doesn’t reduce cost, it just leaves us running a program we’ve invested heavily in without the data to know if it’s working. Splitting it into a separate vote doesn’t change that logic, it just delays it**

Bottom line:** the 28,156 CTX isn’t a discretionary bonus layered on top of the Keeper envelope — it’s the fixed cost of three specific jobs (uncompensated Keeper participation, program administration, and site development) that don’t scale with, and shouldn’t be priced off, what any individual Keeper earns this season.

11

Hello once again everyone,

I agree with @SEEDGov in incorporating the 3,750 CTX Keeper cap. This proposed reduction achieves the treasury efficiency we are aiming for while preserving incentives for active delegates.

Regarding the Task Force budget and analytics scope raised by @Lcedeno24: while I will always advocate for strict treasury care, we must also recognize and properly compensate the essential behind the scenes labor that keeps our governance infrastructure running. Data collection, calculations, analytics, and protocol administration don’t pause when delegate performance fluctuates; someone has to do that work regardless of the outcome, and those analytical pipelines directly support our broader development and operational readiness for $BAGZ. Furthermore, under the proposed scale-down of the overall Keeper reward ceiling, tying Task Force pay to the top-performing delegate creates a double penalty on fixed administrative labor that requires the exact same effort whether participation is high or low.

Keeping the Task Force scope and analytics infrastructure alongside the reduced Keeper cap gives us the tools we need to measure program data and drive accountability. I endorse moving forward with these parameters.

Allez!

12

If administering this program truly requires the task force allocation specified, my opinion is that we should NOT continue with the program as currently designed.

Task force stated purpose was to assign scores and monitor program execution. Score assignment for on-chain activity seems quite objective and straightforward and should require little effort. Score assignment for off-chain activity is definitely more subjective and understandably requires deliberation. I believe the subjectivity of the off-chain score is also what drove the suggestion for task force keeper to be excluded from receiving CKR rewards based on their own participation (due to the potential conflict of interest in assigning a score to themselves).

I believe a simpler program with only on-chain consideration would be much more straightforward and would require very little administration by task force. And by eliminating any potential conflicts of interest, would also allow task force keeper to receive both their own CKR rewards based on activity plus a reasonable program administration allocation (which seems fair given the point that the program administration is above and beyond their normal governance activity).

I would be supportive of further consideration around potentially altering the program in this way to allow it to continue, if that’s something that interests other keepers.

I would also be supportive of ceasing the program due to unacceptable program overhead. Especially given the overall context of our treasury.

Some numbers to consider:

Season 1
18,622.35 CTX → Total Distributed
…16,777.80 CTX → Keeper rewards
…1,844.55 CTX → Task Force
20,133.65 CTX → Total Returned

9.9% Operating Expense Ratio (1844.55/18622.35)

Season 2 (as currently proposed, with consensus adjustment to 3750 keeper cap)
78,156 CTX → MAXIMUM Distributed
…50,000 CTX → MAXIMUM Keeper rewards
…28,156 CTX → Task Force

36.0% MINIMUM Operating Expense Ratio (28156/78156)

Above calculation uses the (unlikely) scenario that ALL available Keeper rewards will be distributed. In Season 1, only 45% of available Keeper rewards were distributed. Even if we project significantly more Keeper participation in Season 2, we can perhaps estimate 70% of available Keeper rewards will be distributed and recalculate:

63,156 CTX → ESTIMATED Distributed
…35,000 CTX → ESTIMATED Keeper rewards
…28,156 CTX → Task Force
15,000 CTX → Total Returned

44.6% ESTIMATED Operating Expense Ratio (28156/63156)

Operating expense ratio in Season 1 seemed reasonable. What is proposed for Season 2 does not seem reasonable. Program with this much overhead seems irresponsible to continue.

Thanks.

1 Like
13

@DesertDwelr laid it out clearly and I must say I agree after looking at the details.

A 44.6% operating expense ratio to administer a rewards program is not something I can support – that’s nearly half the budget going to administration rather than the keepers it’s meant to incentivize.

Two paths forward that would work for me:

  1. Simplify to onchain only. Drop the offchain component, define clear onchain rules, and let it run with minimal overhead. Task force members can still participate as keepers and earn their own rewards. Administration of a purely onchain program shouldn’t require a 28k CTX allocation.
  2. If we keep the task force, cap their compensation at the maximum a single keeper can earn as @DAOplomats proposed (3,750 CTX).

On the analytics site – this shouldn’t cost much. A governance dashboard can be easily vibe coded. I’ve built my own extensive governance dashboard and I’m happy to provide it as a base that can be built upon.

2 Likes
14

Hi there; :nerd_face:

Thanks everyone for the thoughtful discussion, and especially @SEEDGov for taking the initiative to keep this program moving forward.

1. To sum up where we are, IMO

From what I understand, there’s broad agreement on reducing the per-Keeper cap to 3,750 CTX, while the main disagreement concerns the Task Force budget and whether the analytics site should be included.

@DesertDwelr and @dnkta.eth have raised legitimate concerns about overhead, even suggesting an on-chain-only program to reduce complexity.

On the other hand, @Lcedeno24 and @gordinh0x argue that governance coordination, administration, and infrastructure require real work, and their costs shouldn’t necessarily depend on how many Keepers qualify for rewards.

I think both concerns are valid. Rather than focusing exclusively on reducing costs, I’d like us to consider whether we’re investing in the right things.

2. I support continuing CKR and properly compensating SEEDGov

I appreciate SEEDGov’s proactive work. Cryptex needs people willing to take responsibility for developing its governance, and that work deserves recognition and compensation.

I also agree with @lucrica that separating the budgets for Keeper rewards, program administration, and analytics would make these decisions easier to evaluate. That doesn’t necessarily mean spending less, but being clearer about what we’re funding and why.

My concern is that we could end up optimizing the cost of distributing rewards without addressing the underlying challenge:

how do we actually develop a more active and capable governance community?

3. CKR may have an onboarding problem, not just a participation problem

I’m interested in Cryptex governance and have experience contributing to other DAOs. Yet I haven’t been particularly active here. Not because I’m unwilling to contribute, but because I haven’t found a clear path to getting sufficiently involved.

Keeping up with forum discussions requires time and context, and when you’re not already an active, compensated contributor, it’s difficult to justify that investment.

What has worked well for me in other ecosystems is having regular opportunities (ideally synchronous calls) for alignment, discussion, and co-design. These help people understand priorities, build relationships, and identify where they can contribute.

We shouldn’t expect meaningful participation before creating the conditions that make it possible. Perhaps we’re primarily rewarding people who already have the context and capacity to participate, without helping others develop that capacity.

4. Let’s not confuse what’s easy to measure with what’s valuable

I understand the appeal of simplifying CKR to on-chain activity because it would certainly reduce administrative complexity. But I would be cautious about that direction.

Voting is important, but much of the work that makes governance valuable happens before a vote: understanding problems, providing feedback, coordinating contributors, developing proposals, and building alignment.

Even writing a thoughtful comment in this discussion (like I hope is this one) requires time and effort that won’t show up on-chain. The goal should be to reduce the cost of recognizing meaningful contributions, not eliminate them because they’re harder to measure.

5. What if we prioritized onboarding within CKR’s evolution (with its own modest budget)?

Building on @Justmy2Satoshis28’s point about attracting new delegates, I’d suggest exploring how CKR could better support people who are interested but not yet consistently active.

Perhaps we could gradually incorporate a lightweight, compensated onboarding pathway alongside the existing rewards structure.

  • Regular biweekly calls for alignment, context-sharing, and collaborative discussions.
  • Small, predictable stipends that make it easier for interested Keepers to consistently show up and invest time in learning, rather than large rewards tied to individual activities.
  • Clear opportunities to contribute, so participants understand where their skills and experience could add value.
  • Lightweight evaluation, focused on whether people are becoming more capable and engaged contributors, rather than tracking every activity.

I’d favor making this accessible to a reasonably broad group of interested Keepers, rather than selecting only a couple of participants. And perhaps it could become part of the Task Force’s broader mandate.

6. A few questions to help move this forward (and help me get more context):

a) What are we ultimately trying to achieve with CKR? Is success primarily about retaining existing Keepers, increasing voting participation, or developing a broader pool of capable contributors?

b) Should we distinguish between rewarding established contributors and supporting Keepers who are still building the context needed to contribute? Both seem valuable, but they may require different incentives.

c) Could a small portion of CKR’s resources support regular coordination and onboarding, without substantially increasing administrative complexity?

I share the concerns about treasury sustainability, but I also worry that focusing too narrowly on cost reduction could leave Cryptex with an inexpensive rewards program that doesn’t meaningfully strengthen its community.

What would Cryptex need to offer for someone interested, but not yet very active, to become a valuable and sustained governance contributor?

I’m genuinely interested in that question because I fit that profile myself, and I would love to hear your thoughts. :slight_smile:

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Thanks @alexsotodigital. Great points!

On your questions:

  1. What should CKR achieve?

For me, the priority should be helping the DAO make informed decisions that serve the longterm interests of CTX holders. Retaining experienced delegates and bringing in new people can both support that, but increasing the number of paid participants should not be the objective by itself. We should first identify the work that needs doing.

From what I’ve seen, relatively few newcomers express interest or become active in Cryptex governance, even with a rewards program in place, so I appreciate you joining this discussion. Before expanding the program, I’d like to understand whether the main barrier is onboarding, a lack of clear opportunities to contribute, or simply limited interest. Those are different problems and may need different solutions.

  1. Should established contributors and newcomers be supported differently?

Yes, learning the context and delivering work are different things. Newcomers need accessible information, clear opportunities and someone to help them get involved. Personally, I have been involved in governance from the beginning and I’ve onboarded a few delegates. I have always tried to welcome newcomers and help them understand the bigger picture when they’re interested in contributing. I also take your point that valuable work happens before a vote. My earlier suggestion of an onchain-only program was about reducing overhead, not saying that research, coordination and proposal development have no value.

  1. Could some resources support coordination and onboarding?

I understand why you haven’t found a clear place to contribute. From what I’ve seen, there isn’t a clear shared work agenda connecting delegates with the core team’s activities. Participation mostly revolves around reviewing proposals and voting, while anyone wanting to contribute beyond that generally has to initiate something themselves. This is a longstanding gap I see between the core team and the DAO community.

Regular working calls could help us identify what we can actually do together, rather than just receive updates. Before allocating funds to coordination or onboarding, I’d like us to define those priorities, the responsibilities involved and what support would be needed.

On Task Force compensation, I want to be clear that I think @SEEDGov should be paid for the work they have done so far. My concern is how we structure and fund the program going forward. Separating administration, delegate contributions and analytics would help us assess what each actually costs.

For this CKR proposal specifically, I’d like to see a breakdown of the costs, clear objectives for the next season and an assessment of previous results: how many new delegates became active, whether they stayed involved and how participation changed. This could be a useful starting point for the analytics work being discussed.

At first glance, CKR seems to have done more to encourage active governance participation than staking rewards, although I’d like to test that against the data. I advocated for higher staking rewards in Season 2 and the community approved them, but from what I’ve seen, the amount of CTX staked has since declined rather than increased.

That does not necessarily mean the rewards had no effect, since withdrawals and other factors also matter. But it is worth reviewing whether we are attracting and retaining participants, increasing delegated stake or mainly rewarding existing activity.

Both programs aim to encourage governance participation, although they serve different roles. That’s why I think we should evaluate their results before deciding on further funding.

As you may have seen, I’ve been vocal both here and on Discord about treasury discipline and being careful with the DAO’s remaining resources. That is why treasury runway is directly relevant to this thread: we are considering another CTX allocation from a finite treasury.

Longer term, I’d like these programs to be funded by revenue actually available to the DAO, rather than repeated allocations from its finite CTX treasury. Until then, I would prioritize essential work and preserving capital.

I support building a stronger governance community. I just want the scope and compensation to match the resources we actually have.

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I think we’re actually quite aligned @dnkta.eth. A few thoughts building on your points:

1. Start with the work that needs doing, not with incentives

I think this is exactly where we should start.

On your question about whether the main barrier is onboarding, unclear opportunities, or limited interest, I can only speak from my experience: I’m interested in contributing, but I don’t know what Cryptex actually needs from me.

Without that clarity, participation risks becoming performative: staying visible in the forum, commenting without enough context, or voting on proposals I don’t fully understand. I don’t think that’s particularly valuable for the DAO either.

Before onboarding more contributors, we need to understand what we’re onboarding them into. Otherwise, it’s a bit like hiring people without knowing what work you need them to do.

2. A shared work agenda should translate into clear contribution opportunities

I think we need a clearer connection between the core team’s priorities and the opportunities available for DAO contributors. Trying to initiate something independently, without understanding those priorities, can easily lead to wasted effort.

I’ve seen a proposal gaining community support but then struggle to move forward because the ‘core team’ isn’t aligned with it or doesn’t have the capacity to support its implementation. This is frustrating for contributors and inefficient for the DAO.

What I’d love to see is a set of clearly defined contribution opportunities, based on Cryptex’s current strategic needs. Ideally, each would clarify:

  • Intent: What problem are we trying to solve, and why now?
  • Role: What is the purpose, and what responsibilities does it involve?
  • Requirements: What skills and approximate time commitment are expected?
  • Outcomes: What would success look like?
  • Compensation: What baseline support is available for the work, and are there additional rewards for exceptional results?

Not every delegate needs a formal role, of course. Independent governance participation remains important. But for those interested in contributing more actively, this would make it much easier to understand where we could add value and whether we can realistically commit.

3. Coordination first, onboarding second, rewards third

Absolutely. And I think this points toward a relatively simple sequence:

First, establish a shared work agenda. The core team and DAO should periodically align on current priorities, challenges, and opportunities for contribution. This doesn’t mean delegates should simply execute the core team’s agenda, but both sides need enough context to identify where collaboration makes sense.

Btw, I suspect better alignment between the core team and DAO could unlock more value (aka treasury runway).

Second, support ongoing coordination and onboarding. Perhaps the existing Task Force (aka @seedgov) , with an appropriately defined mandate and compensation, could facilitate regular biweekly working calls with core team participation.

These shouldn’t just be status updates, but opportunities to discuss priorities, identify work, and coordinate efforts. The Task Force could also help interested delegates get involved through office hours, introductions, or lightweight onboarding.

Third, reward meaningful contributions. Once responsibilities and expected outcomes are clearer, CKR can become a mechanism for recognizing contributors who consistently deliver value or exceed expectations.

I would still support small, predictable stipends to help people sustain their involvement, especially while building context. But larger rewards should be connected to meaningful contributions rather than simply showing up or voting.

4. Treasury discipline and contributor confidence can reinforce each other

I agree with your emphasis on treasury discipline, and especially with the longer-term aspiration to fund governance through revenue available to the DAO rather than continuously drawing from a finite treasury.

At the same time, I think we should consider the cost of uncertainty for potential contributors.

From my perspective, the biggest barrier isn’t necessarily the amount of compensation available. It’s the difficulty of knowing whether investing time and energy into Cryptex will lead to meaningful work that the DAO actually values and is willing to support.

If I understand the priorities, have a clear mandate, and know what compensation is available for delivering agreed outcomes, I’m much more willing to commit my time and take responsibility for producing value.

Without that clarity, contributing becomes a speculative investment of time. And given how uncertain DAO governance can already be, that’s a difficult proposition.

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