ACC Creation Proposal

Proposals
1

Summary

Governance participation is a central pillar in achieving transparency and decentralization in any DAO. This proposal suggests creating a new wallet that would receive 100,000 CTX from the DAO treasury and cast a vote in favor of or against a proposal that has not yet met quorum. The goal is to ensure that quorum is met for all proposal votes, even if top delegates are unavailable.

This proposal aims to address a voting supply-related issue by ensuring that governance votes do not fail purely due to not reaching quorum. We recognize that delegates have personal and professional responsibilities that may occasionally prevent them from casting a vote.

While we continue working to bring more qualified delegates into the DAO, it is important to address issues that could cause a key proposal to fail due to insufficient quorum.

Reasoning

Voting participation is a critical concern for the future of the DAO:

  • Total delegated CTX at the time of drafting this proposal: 1.33M
  • Average CTX used per vote since September 2024: 587.76K
  • 6 Keepers hold approximately 45% of the delegated CTX

We are currently in a position where, if a few top delegates miss a vote due to unforeseen circumstances, proposals are at risk of not reaching quorum. This creates an unnecessary bottleneck for the DAO and could lead to increased voter apathy if left unaddressed.

To mitigate this, we propose creating a multisig wallet that will use its 100,000 CTX delegation to cast a vote in the event that a proposal is at risk of not reaching quorum. This effectively lowers the quorum threshold without affecting the simple majority condition required for a proposal to pass.

Operational

The operational process will be as follows:

  • If approved, the Governance Team will set up a new multisig wallet, which will receive the 100,000 CTX.
  • The multisig wallet will be administered by four members who will act as an Anti-Capture Committee (ACC): two members from the Cryptex Core Contributors and two from the pool of Keepers.
  • In order to be considered for the two remaining positions on the committee, Keepers who are interested must complete a form provided by the Governance Team. All those interested in applying will have three days to complete the form after it is published. Once the submission period ends, the Governance Team will create a vote and publish the names of the applicants. All community members, including the applicants themselves, will have the opportunity to vote for the person they wish to support for the ACC role. The two candidates with the highest number of votes will be appointed to the committee.
  • In addition to executing votes when necessary, the ACC will be responsible for putting all proposals up for vote on the Cryptex Governance site (Tally, at the time of drafting this proposal).
  • The decision on whether the committee should cast a vote will be determined by the total number of votes cast for and against a proposal. If the total number of votes cast by the rest of the Keepers is equal to or less than 50% of the required quorum with less than 24 hours before the voting periods ends the committee will be required to execute their vote.
  • In order to proceed with casting a vote in favor of the proposal, the committee must reach either unanimous agreement or a 3-to-1 majority in support.
  • If this criterion is not met, the committee will be required to vote against the proposal.
  • Members of this committee will still be allowed to create proposals, give endorsements, and cast votes using their own delegated voting power, even if their actions as members of the ACC are required.

Financial

The total budget for this proposal is 100,000 CTX, to be delegated to a single multisig controlled by the members of the ACC. The funds will be returned to the treasury if and when this mechanism is no longer required to guarantee quorum for DAO votes.

Technically, there is no direct cost to operate this program. No additional DAO funds will be needed to pay personnel or for tools. Any nominal costs (e.g., multisig setup) will be covered under the currently approved operations budget.

Conclusion

If this proposal passes, the Governance Team will proceed with the creation of the multisig wallet and the transfer of 100,000 CTX from the DAO treasury to that address.

Once this process is complete, the Governance Team will provide a link to the application form, allowing all Keepers interested in being considered for the two remaining committee spots to apply.

Once the two remaining spots on the committee have being filled the Governance Team will add them to the multisig.

1 Like
2

I’m in support of this proposal!

3

If the total number of votes cast by the rest of the Keepers is greater than 50% of the required quorum, is the commitee always restricted from voting?

1 Like
4

Thanks for the proposal on creating the Anti-Capture Committee (ACC).
It’s a smart step toward addressing quorum issues and governance risks in Cryptex.

I appreciate the focus on reliability and preventing capture, especially drawing from models like Optimism’s ACC. That said, I have a concern about the proposed composition: including 2 core team members alongside 2 delegates. While core team brings valuable expertise and availability, it could introduce potential bias or perceptions of centralization, as core contributors prioritize project-specific interests over broader community ones. We’ve seen similar debates in other DAOs, like Arbitrum’s Security Council discussions, where mixing insiders and outsiders is common but often evolves toward more external representation to enhance neutrality.

Instead, I’d suggest making the ACC fully composed of outside participants, reputable and well-known figures in the DeFi or DAO space who are genuinely interested in Cryptex, actively engaged (e.g., with a track record of governance contributions elsewhere), and unbiased (no direct ties to the core team or existing delegates).

This could be achieved through: Community nominations and elections for all 4 spots, focusing on outsiders with established reputations (e.g., active delegates from other protocols like Optimism or Arbitrum, or independent experts in governance security).

Criteria like proven past activity in similar roles, and no conflicts of interest.
Term limits or rotations to keep it fresh and accountable.

Since outside people might not want to participate in this role for free, adding some kind of incentives, like retroactive compensation based on performance could boost participation and attract top talent. This approach would boost decentralization while still ensuring the committee can step in for quorum without any insider influence or redundancy from existing delegates. What do others think?

3 Likes
5

Thank you for asking @Mkatx5

If the total number of votes cast by the rest of the keepers is equal to or higher than 50% the required quorum the ACC will not vote, the reason being that this is not meant to be a way to approve or reject proposals, it’s just a mechanism of making sure that we have a safety valve in case that for whatever reason we are at risk of not hitting quorum for any proposals that are being considered.

6

Hey @dnkta.eth,

Thank you for your comments and explanation regarding the proposal — here’s what I would say:

First of all, it’s important to make it clear that the ACC is not intended as a way to approve or reject any proposals. It’s simply a mechanism to ensure that, in case we don’t have enough participation for whatever reason, we are still able to address proposals coming either from the contributors team or the community in general.

Secondly, under no circumstances will the two members from the contributors team have the ability to influence the committee’s decision regarding the vote for or against a proposal. That is why a minimum of 3-to-1 is required in order to vote for a proposal. If that requirement is not met, the vote would be against.

Another important point is that the two members of the contributors team will have no say in choosing the two Keepers who will complete the committee. It will be you, the Keepers, who make that decision yourselves as the proposal states. There is no intention from the contributors and/or founders to impose any decisions or agendas. On the contrary, these efforts are being made to ensure that we can keep things moving forward even if some of the top delegates are unable to participate in a particular vote.

I believe the way this proposal is written proves that we are doing our best to promote decentralization and participation. The fact that the committee is composed of 50% contributors and 50% Keepers with equal decision-making power is a testament to that.

Regarding your comment about compensation: that’s a valid point, and it’s something being reviewed as part of the update to our current incentive program, which will need to be addressed before the end of the year.

The intention here is for anyone to be able to put their name forward to join the committee, and for the community without any internal influence to decide who gets the role. We want to work together as a team and continue making decisions as a team. That’s the only way we’ll reach the goals we’ve set and make Cryptex into what we all want it to be.

Lastly, the two people who will be part of the committee from the contributors team will be @Crisgarner and myself. We are both committed to doing our best and working together with the other members of the ACC to keep the ball rolling when the time comes.

1 Like
7

I would say that if we wanted a fully truly decentralized and unbiased mechanism, a smart contract that votes abstain would be the best. The main issue is that the Governance contracts only support yes or no votes. So we have three options:

  1. Update governance contracts: we definitely want to do this in a future but requieres time and testing.
  2. Create a contract that splits the votes in 100k and votes yes and no: Requires an audit and development.
  3. Make a multisig and define rules to only vote on non contentious proposals: This proposal, faster but requires coordination and commitment from actors.

Given that we now have a clear defined governance process, this ACC is a temporal fix to defend against quorum failures, the amount of work from a committee isn’t hight (just define if a proposal is non contentious and is going to fail because of quorum issues). I personally incline for option three, thinking that in a future we will queue some time to update the governance contracts.

2 Likes
8

Thanks for the detailed response! I appreciate the clarity on the ACC’s purpose and the 3/4 multisig threshold for “yes” votes, which addresses my concern about potential bias from core team members. The fact that a 2-2 split or 3-1 against defaults to a “no” vote feels like a solid safeguard to ensure neutrality and prevent capture. I’m also encouraged by the community-driven selection for the non-core spots and the upcoming incentive review to attract engaged participants.

2 Likes
9

Just to be clear, a 2-2 or a 3-1 against, won’t trigger a “No Vote” it will simply won’t vote on a proposal, as a No vote will help to reach quorum and the goal of the ACC is only to help proposals that are passing but require some help with the Quorum.

EDIT:

I re-read the proposal, and 2-2 or 3-1 against will trigger a “No Vote” as the ACC wants to maintain a quorum, regardless of whether the proposal passes or not.

2 Likes
10

I see, makes sense now!

11

Sorry if this is a dumb question, but why not just lower quorum by 100k? Seems like that would allow for the same overall number of at-risk proposals to meet quorum, but would not influence the results at all. Honoring the simple majority of actual votes cast instead of significantly raising the count of whatever side the 4 representatives choose.

Maybe another dumb question, but if a vote does not reach quorum in the allotted time, is there any option to extend the cutoff date? I agree that sometimes personal and professional responsibilities may prevent a delegate from being able to cast a vote over a standard voting period, but if it were an option to extend votes for an additional Y days if quorum not met by day X that may also provide a higher rate of votes that achieve quorum.

Last dumb question – the way this is designed, isnt there still a good chance quorum won’t be met even if the committee votes? Since the committee votes when the vote total at 24h is <50% of quorum, that currently means that it would vote only when total is <200k votes, so after ACC voting the total would still be <300k votes. While that certainly moves things closer to the 400k quorum, seems there’s still a pretty good chance that quorum will not even be met.

And if enough additional votes DO come in to reach quorum, the effect of those 100k ACC votes could actually override the will of the majority.

Example: 24 hours before voting ends, 199k votes have been cast. 120k FOR, 79k AGAINST. (so roughly 3:2 FOR). By rule, committee would have to vote since <50% of quorum. Committee is split, so 100k votes go AGAINST. Which flips vote to 179k AGAINST, 120k FOR (so roughly 3:2 AGAINST). If no other votes come in then it doesnt matter either way - ACC didn’t result in quorum being met. But if enough votes DO come in to reach quorum, for sake of this example lets continue with the way the community was trending 3:2 FOR so we’ll say 60k additional FOR and 41k additional AGAINST. The total would then be 220k AGAINST, 180k FOR so the vote would be rejected. EVEN THOUGH the community consistently voted 3:2 in support.

Compare that to just lowering the quorum to 300k and NOT including an ACC vote. Under the same scenario as above, anything less than 300k votes from the community would result in a quorum not reached scenario (SAME). However, if the community votes came in as described it would be 180k FOR, 120k AGAINST. So the vote would pass, in line with the voice of the community (NOT influenced by the voice of the committee). This seems more decentralized and transparent to me, but I honestly could just be missing something.

Overall, I guess just a bit concerned about the weight of 100k votes by a small number of committee members on an already low turnout vote (which is the only time this would be invoked).

Thanks for reading this far and for any additional clarity you could provide!

2 Likes
12

Hey @DesertDwelr thank you very much for your comments. We certainly appreciate this level of interaction, as it helps build clarity and promotes participation.

Here are my thoughts:

Lowering the quorum is definitely a path, but one that carries a lot of risk. This is why it hasn’t been used by protocols in the past. For starters, it can be seen—both internally and externally—as a way of trying to control the outcome of an election, and at the same time, it establishes a precedent that could open the door for other forms of interference.

To your question regarding a possible time extension: once the proposal has entered the voting period, there is no way to extend that period. The outcome will either be in favor, against, or a failed proposal in case quorum isn’t reached. That being said, it is possible to put the same proposal up for a vote as many times as needed if a decision wasn’t made due to lack of quorum.

On your third question—you are totally right! Even if this proposal passes and the ACC is established, there’s still a possibility that a proposal could fail due to lack of quorum. But ultimately, that is something we will have to live with, as it is a natural part of an election process.

This is the logic behind the 100K voting power of the ACC:

The ACC is not meant to be a mechanism for passing proposals. It is just a temporary aid in case we find ourselves unable to reach quorum for any reason. Even if those votes don’t make us reach quorum (which is unlikely, considering we currently have an average of 634K votes cast in each proposal voted on during 2025), the ACC would still be fulfilling one of its duties, which is to put the proposals up for a vote.

The end goal here would be for the ACC not to vote at all, because we always have enough participation. And for sure, the idea of those 100K votes shifting the election one way or the other is not part of the plan either—but it is true that it might happen.

To this, I would say two things: First, that the members of the ACC will have the responsibility of always thinking about what’s best for the DAO and engaging in the conversation with the rest of the committee in the hope of making the best decision. Second, even if those votes end up moving the needle, I personally feel okay with that because let’s not forget that the members are still part of the community—as keepers and contributors.

The creation of the ACC is not the best way to address the quorum “problem,” but as of right now, it is our best option.

Once we are able to update the governance contract (something to be done by EOY), we are going to change the ACC format to an Auto-Abstain Wallet (via proposal, if approved). This is going to allow us to continue putting proposals up for a vote and help reach quorum—without interfering in the result of the vote.

As I mentioned, this is our best shot for now, and I would definitely encourage all delegates to rally around this concept, as its only purpose is to help Cryptex grow.

13

Thanks for the response. I’ll admit I’m still not really on board.

I do understand the interference risk of lowering quorum so I am good with not pursuing that.

I guess I’m still a little unclear as to why this is even needed since as you stated we’ve been clearing quorum by ~200k votes each time. Plus the changes being made in the recent Governance Process proposal should make the voting periods even more predictable and easier for delegates to plan.

Feels like a proposal like this would be more appropriate if we had a history of “quorum not met” votes that have impacted progress. But that’s not our reality.

I may still be missing something, but I just don’t feel like the potential for shifting a vote outcome (or the trust issues that could result from that perception) is worth it given that quorum hasn’t really been an issue.

Of course the keepers and contributors are part of the community and their votes should be considered. Once. I just don’t see the good that comes from granting additional voting power, even if its our hope that it’s never used.

Personally, I think the damage done by having to repeat a vote because quorum wasn’t reached due to top delegates’ personal or professional responsibilities getting in the way is much lower than the damage done by the committee changing the outcome of a vote (or even the perception/concern that they might).

Not saying I’m an absolute no. Maybe I’m just not getting it. But based on what I understand, I’d prefer to table this idea unless/until consistently reaching quorum becomes an issue.

Thanks again for your thoughts and for allowing me to express mine.

2 Likes
14

Hey @DesertDwelr

First let me say how happy it makes me that we are having this conversation and that the community is engaging with what we are doing here.

I honestly see nothing wrong in your analysis, only thing I can say is that we are trying to prevent any possible issues regarding quorum ( I certainly prefer a scenario in which a proposal doesn’t pass, even if it’s one that I personally think it should, than having a proposal fail to meet quorum), You are totally right that we have managed to clear quorum, but that’s not a guarantee and lastly that this mechanism is not going to be permanent, just a temporal safeguard in case we need it.

We still have some time before the week ends to see what other delegates have to say about it and to determine if we can move this to a vote next week or if we are going to need more time to keep the conversations going and maybe put it up for vote on the third week of August.

15

gm gm Cryptex DAO,

Quorum‑assurance and anti‑capture mechanisms like the ACC are a common best practice in many major DAOs. The fact that Cryptex has not yet required such a safeguard does not mean we shouldn’t proactively implement one. In fact, it’s much better to have this in place before a governance challenge arises rather than scrambling to react in the moment.

It’s worth noting that a DAO where proposals can pass with the participation of only a handful of delegates, sometimes as few as two, can be efficient, but also exposes us to potential governance risk. The ACC is not designed to interfere with legitimate decision‑making; rather, it adds an extra layer of security by creating a controlled, transparent vehicle run by those most invested in the long‑term health of the protocol, namely, the core team and our most committed delegates.

One point of confusion seems to come from the fact that our current Governor contract does not allow for an “abstain” vote. With the proposed 2/2 setup, any lack of consensus within the ACC defaults to a “no” vote. This ensures that even if quorum is reached, the sentiment of the ACC, and by extension, a cautious governance stance is still clearly represented.

Additionally, there is the important aspect of clarifying who holds responsibility for submitting proposals for a vote. In many DAOs, this is taken for granted as a foundation duty. Due to Cryptex’s structure, there has been no such clarity. Assigning this task to the ACC removes ambiguity and provides a clearly defined governance process, small but meaningful improvement to our overall governance framework.

Finally, I would encourage delegates to welcome more complex governance structures like the ACC. While they may add some operational overhead, they also create the foundation for more sophisticated and impactful proposals to emerge and succeed within a stronger, more resilient governance framework.

Overall, the ACC is a sensible, forward‑looking safeguard. It gives us a quorum safety net, clearer governance responsibilities, and protection against ill‑intentioned activity, all without undermining the will of the community.

I endorse this proposal. Delegate profile.

1 Like
16

I agree with that. Perhaps having this new committee just create the proposals and not do any voting is also an option in my eyes, after seeing @DesertDwelr’s comments and thinking more about this. Lately, I have been creating the onchain proposals, and it’s no issue for me to continue doing that, but it would be a more standard process if we can offload that to the new committee.

In my opinion, we should instead push for more incentives for CTX holders and delegates so they stake more CTX and take the time to review proposals and vote.The top 10 delegates on Cryptex Finance have almost 600k CTX delegated to them. Even if not all 10 delegates vote on one proposal, there’s still a high chance we can hit quorum, even if quorum is increased from 400k CTX to 500k CTX for more security.

Staked CTX has been rapidly growing since we increased the rewards in the Single-Sided Staking LTP, which shows that incentives are working and CTX staked is increasing over time.

The airdrop we did for delegates was nice, but this was a one-time retroactive thing, and it seems like it was not enough to keep delegates active. There needs to be an ongoing incentive program for active delegates based on their voting performance.

By focusing on these ongoing incentives, we can boost organic participation from CTX holders and delegates, fostering sustainable engagement and reducing the need for temporary fixes like the ACC.