2026-2027 Market Making Proposal Overview

Proposals
1

Hello Cryptex Community,

Here is the 2026-2027 Market Making proposal for your review, given the nature of the proposal and the urgency to make a decision on which of the options we will be moving forwards with to avoid any interruptions ins the service we will be expediting the vote for this proposal.

The day we are targeting for the vote to begin is Wednesday June 10th and just as a reminder which ever option you prefer please make to it clear in your comments as we need at least 3 endorsements to move that specific option to a vote.

Two bids have been submitted for consideration by the DAO, which retains ownership of all CTX inventory loaned for these specific market-making purposes. Both proposals seek to improve CTX liquidity and trading conditions while utilizing a 600,000 CTX inventory loan. Under either proposal, the DAO would be responsible for payment of the monthly retainer if approved through governance and documented in a final agreement. The proposals below are being presented as submitted by the respective market makers. To help prevent potential front-running or other market impacts during the evaluation process, the identities of the market makers are not being disclosed at this stage.

Proposal A - Hybrid Retainer Structure Terms600,000 CTX inventory loan

    • Monthly retainer: $5,000 USD
    • Exchanges: Coinbase, Gemini, Bitstamp

    Market Operations

    • Trading software active at least 99% of exchange uptime
    • Spread below 0.5%, subject to exchange fees and lender preference
    • Market depth minimum of 25 order sizes on both sides, subject to exchange limits
    • Endeavour to maintain $15,000 aggregate order book total depth within +/- 2% across all venues

    Alternative Repayment Schedule

    • 50% * 7D TWAP at commencement
    • 50% * 7D TWAP 6 months after commencement

    Proposal B - Retainer and KPI Structure Terms

    • 600,000 CTX inventory loan
    • Option: 600,000 CTX + 200%
    • Monthly retainer: $5,000 USD
    • Duration: 12 months

    KPIs

    • 95% uptime
    • Minimum depth requirements:
      • $2,000 per side within 2% of the mid-price per exchange
        • $25,000 per side outside of 2% of the mid-price per exchange

    *Disclaimer

    The information presented above is provided solely for governance discussion purposes and does not constitute a recommendation, endorsement, solicitation, investment advice, legal advice, or a commitment by Cryptex Finance LLC, its contributors, service providers, delegates, or any affiliated party. Both proposals remain subject to approval through the DAO governance process. The terms summarized herein are preliminary in nature and are subject to governance vote or execution of a definitive agreement. The proposals presented should not be considered definitive legal, commercial, or operational terms. In the event of any discrepancy between this summary and any final agreement, the executed agreement shall control. Cryptex Finance LLC is presenting the proposals above solely for governance discussion purposes. Cryptex Finance LLC is not the market maker and does not direct, supervise, or control the market maker’s day-to-day trading activities, market-making strategies, capital deployment, inventory management, compliance practices, operational decisions, or business activities. Cryptex Finance LLC shall not be responsible or liable for any losses, damages, claims, costs, expenses, trading outcomes, liquidity outcomes, market impacts, exchange actions, delistings, counterparty events, regulatory actions, or other consequences arising from or relating to any market-making arrangement approved by the DAO.
    Any market-making arrangement ultimately approved by the DAO shall be governed exclusively by the terms of the final executed agreement between the applicable parties.

    Cryptex Finance LLC makes no representations or warranties regarding future token performance, liquidity outcomes, trading volumes, exchange activity, execution quality, market conditions, listings, delistings, or the economic value of any proposed compensation structure.
    Any market-making arrangement approved by the DAO may not achieve its intended objectives and involves operational, counterparty, market, technological, regulatory, and other risks.

    No representation is made regarding the continued availability of any exchange listing or trading venue. Exchange listing decisions are made independently by the applicable exchanges and may be influenced by a variety of factors, including liquidity, trading activity, compliance requirements, and market conditions.

    Delegates should independently evaluate the benefits, costs, risks, and potential implications associated with each proposal and reach their own conclusions regarding the structure that best serves the long-term interests of the protocol.

1 Like
2

Thanks for sharing.

Looks like both options include a monthly retainer, something I don’t think we’ve seen before. Can we get a little insight as to why? It seems undesirable and maybe is just the state of the market or perhaps I’m misreading and going with a retainer is something we actually wanted because it gets countered by some benefit? Would we prefer something that is more like past agreements and if so, have we asked the candidate for something like that?

For Proposal A, can you provide more information on alternative repayment schedule? Is this saying that at the end of the agreement instead of returning the full CTX loaned they have the option of buying 50% of the tokens at the 7-day TWAP from the beginning of the agreement and also the option of buying 50% of the tokens at the 7-day TWAP from the 6 month point of the agreement? I think in past MM agreements these alternative options weren’t necessarily exercised, but would we be ok with a situation where 600k CTX potentially don’t get returned to the treasury? Would that impact our ability to provide liquidity for the period that follows?

For Proposal B can you explain more about what “Option: 600,000 CTX + 200%” means? Unless I’m misunderstanding it seems like Proposal B has worse uptime and depth but has the same retainer fee, so I’m trying to understand what factors may be better than A and perhaps the explanation of this option will make it clear. Also, it looks like Proposal B doesn’t specify exchanges - does this imply the same exchanges as A or do we need to be explicit?

On the point of exchanges, is it not an option to have them provide DEX liquidity? I think that’s something we’ve expressed desire for in previous MM discussions and still seems like it would be a positive thing if the MM is willing.

Are we only working with a single MM? Did we select this one competitively or is it the only one that will work with us? If competitive, what were the criteria that led us to this?

Was the 600k number specified by the MM? Given our limited remaining treasury, I thought we were potentially considering a lower number – is that an option?

I appreciate that a couple alternative proposals were presented, but the “pick one of these quickly so we can vote in 5 days” nature of this doesn’t seem to be in the spirit of what @dnkta.eth had requested in the crypt-keepers chat to get the DAO involved much earlier this time around - before any terms were prepared and providing the ability to shape the key points we wanted to prioritize in the agreement.

Thanks

1 Like
3

I agree with DesertDwelr’s questions.

I’m not against market making, but I’m not comfortable endorsing either option as written. The DAO asked to be involved earlier in shaping this structure, and now we are being asked to choose between already prepared options on a very short timeline.

My main concern is size and treasury impact. CTX is much more widely circulating now than in prior years, and I know team members are already providing liquidity themselves. DAO members can also provide liquidity through CEX limit orders, and the SubDAO can provide single sided CTX liquidity if needed. There is enough capital around the ecosystem that I don’t think 600k CTX should be the default starting point anymore. I would prefer a smaller base loan, around 200k CTX.

I also need clarity on how the $5k/month retainer is funded. Where is this supposed to come from if the DAO treasury does not have enough USDC to cover the full retainer? If this means selling CTX each month to pay the retainer, I’m against that.

One more important point: why are the market maker names not disclosed? In prior proposals, the counterparties were named, and I don’t think the DAO can properly approve an agreement without knowing who it is with. Are both options from the same market maker? If yes, why is there no second counterparty option? If no, why are the two counterparties being hidden?

Also, KPI reporting should be public to DAO members. In the past we have not had enough visibility into market maker performance, so we don’t really know what value the previous agreements delivered. If we approve another agreement, the DAO should receive regular reporting on spreads, depth, uptime, venues supported, and whether the agreed targets are being met.

Finally, I don’t think the DAO should give market makers upside through unclear option/TWAP mechanics while the DAO still carries the downside risk of reduced treasury inventory, sell pressure, or weaker liquidity if the arrangement does not perform.

So my preference is: disclose the counterparties, smaller base inventory, public KPI reporting, no unnecessary upside giveaway, clear repayment terms, and more time for DAO review before this goes onchain.

One additional question: how are these proposals different from the past market maker agreements where we had strike price / option structures? In plain English, what is better or worse about this new structure compared to the prior ones? What benefit does the DAO get here that it did not get before?

Before approving a new agreement, I also think we should understand the outcome of the previous market maker agreements. When will the DAO know whether the prior market makers are returning CTX or USDC, and on what terms? It would make sense to see the result of those agreements before approving new ones.

4

Hi everyone,

Evaluating the proposals as-written, I see Proposal A as the superior choice. It names top-tier exchanges, it guarantees a tighter spread, it commits to a better uptime, and poses significantly less upside risk if CTX enters a bull run.

One question: have the funds for the retainer fee already been set aside as part of the latest operational budget approval?

Lastly, I agree with the sentiment that it would have been nice to have a discussion about the 600k CTX loan amount prior to seeking proposals.

5

Thanks for the thoughtful questions.

A few quick responses.

Why retainers?

Historically, market makers were often willing to engage under inventory loan structures alone.

The feedback we received this cycle was that if the DAO wants defined and measurable KPIs and explicit liquidity commitments, those services now come with an explicit cost.

This is not unique to Cryptex.

Both counterparties proposed hybrid structures rather than traditional inventory-only arrangements, which in theory should result in stronger liquidity commitments than what exists today.

Proposal A offers approximately $15k of aggregate liquidity within +/-2% across three venues at 99% uptime.

This equates to approximately $2.5k per side within 2%.

Proposal A repayment schedule

Under the proposed structure, the market maker would have the ability to purchase portions of the inventory at pricing determined by the applicable 7-day TWAP periods rather than simply returning all inventory in CTX.

Specifically, 300k CTX would be subject to the commencement TWAP and 300k CTX would be subject to the TWAP six months later.

In either scenario, the expectation is that value is returned to the DAO treasury in the form contemplated by the agreement, whether that ultimately consists of CTX, USDC, or a combination thereof pursuant to the final terms.

That structure was proposed by the market maker and delegates should absolutely consider the tradeoffs associated with it.

Proposal B

Proposal B offers $2k per side within 2% and $25k per side outside of 2% at 95-99% uptime.

Proposal B’s proposed option structure is based on the price at the time of agreement plus 200%.

As with Proposal A, delegates should carefully consider the tradeoffs associated with that structure.

Timing

Typically proposals have a 7-day discussion period prior to voting. Apologies if this particular discussion window was compressed to 5 days. Market makers generally do not negotiate commercial terms weeks or months in advance as markets are ever changing, and these are the proposals we received on 6/5 for loans that end 6/16 and 6/18 respectively. Due to timing, this resulted in a shorter discussion period than usual.

Exchanges

Proposal A explicitly includes Coinbase, Gemini, and Bitstamp.

Proposal B includes Coinbase and Bitstamp.

We currently have existing Gemini coverage if Proposal B were ultimately selected through existing delta-neutral liquidity support.

Proposal B seeks to improve liquidity where additional opportunities may become available in the future if trading activity improves.

Proposal A would likely be open to similar discussions as well.

Of course, no future listing, venue expansion, or liquidity outcome is guaranteed under either proposal.

Single market maker vs multiple market makers

The current proposals are competing proposals.

The DAO is not being asked to approve both.

One market maker would receive the allocation because that is what each counterparty proposed.

Based on our discussions, both counterparties indicated that 600k CTX was the allocation they were willing to support.

Earlier DAO involvement

I think this is probably the strongest point in your post.

There is a legitimate discussion to be had around whether the DAO should establish a more formal process for defining objectives before counterparties are approached so members can participate more directly in shaping these decisions.

This is a topic I have raised previously and one I believe is worth discussing further.

Personally, I think that conversation naturally leads to broader governance questions around representation, negotiation authority, procurement processes, and execution authority.

Those are discussions worth having by the community regardless of which proposal the DAO ultimately selects.

Appreciate the questions.

Disclaimer: The information above is provided for governance discussion purposes only and is intended to summarize proposal terms as currently understood. Delegates should review the full proposal materials and independently evaluate the benefits, costs, risks, and tradeoffs associated with each proposal before voting. Any final arrangement remains subject to DAO approval. Delegates should also consider the potential implications of maintaining, modifying, or discontinuing market-making arrangements, including impacts on liquidity, trading activity, exchange listings, and broader market participation. Sustained reductions in liquidity and market quality may adversely affect exchange support and listing decisions, which remain within the discretion of the applicable exchanges.

6

My responses are in italics.

I agree with DesertDwelr’s questions.

I’m not against market making, but I’m not comfortable endorsing either option as written. The DAO asked to be involved earlier in shaping this structure, and now we are being asked to choose between already prepared options on a very short timeline.

The DAO has been asked for months to establish a formal structure capable of negotiating and executing agreements directly to avoid exactly this. To date, that has not occurred.

Even if there had been additional discussions beforehand, both market makers ultimately presented the same position: these are the structures they are willing to offer. We can certainly provide feedback, but counterparties ultimately decide what services they are willing to provide and under what terms.

My main concern is size and treasury impact. CTX is much more widely circulating now than in prior years, and I know team members are already providing liquidity themselves. DAO members can also provide liquidity through CEX limit orders, and the SubDAO can provide single sided CTX liquidity if needed. There is enough capital around the ecosystem that I don’t think 600k CTX should be the default starting point anymore. I would prefer a smaller base loan, around 200k CTX.

That feedback is completely reasonable and we are happy to relay it. Based on our discussions, however, both counterparties indicated that 600k CTX was the allocation they were willing to support under their proposed structures.

I also need clarity on how the $5k/month retainer is funded. Where is this supposed to come from if the DAO treasury does not have enough USDC to cover the full retainer? If this means selling CTX each month to pay the retainer, I’m against that.

Under the proposals received, the counterparties are requiring compensation in exchange for defined liquidity commitments and KPIs. The protocol owns these assets. The protocol must pay for these services.

One more important point: why are the market maker names not disclosed? In prior proposals, the counterparties were named, and I don’t think the DAO can properly approve an agreement without knowing who it is with. Are both options from the same market maker? If yes, why is there no second counterparty option? If no, why are the two counterparties being hidden?

There are two counterparties and confidentiality was requested during the evaluation process. Both market makers are well known and have established track records making markets on CEX venues CTX is currently available.

More broadly, counterparties generally engage with identifiable entities. This is one of the reasons I have repeatedly suggested the DAO consider establishing a formal structure capable of negotiating and executing agreements directly if that is the direction the community wishes to pursue.

Also, KPI reporting should be public to DAO members. In the past we have not had enough visibility into market maker performance, so we don’t really know what value the previous agreements delivered. If we approve another agreement, the DAO should receive regular reporting on spreads, depth, uptime, venues supported, and whether the agreed targets are being met.

The challenge is balancing transparency against the potential consequences of publicly disclosing execution and liquidity data.

If delegates believe such information should be disclosed, I think it would be helpful to review examples of comparable protocols that do so successfully and understand how they mitigate the associated risks.

Finally, I don’t think the DAO should give market makers upside through unclear option/TWAP mechanics while the DAO still carries the downside risk of reduced treasury inventory, sell pressure, or weaker liquidity if the arrangement does not perform.

Every structure involves tradeoffs.

The DAO can absolutely prioritize lower inventory allocations, fewer option rights, additional reporting, or stronger liquidity commitments.

The challenge is that counterparties may assign different economic costs to each of those requirements. If they do not agree, then what?

Ultimately the question is not what the DAO would ideally prefer in isolation, but what arrangements are realistically available in the market today.

So my preference is: disclose the counterparties, smaller base inventory, public KPI reporting, no unnecessary upside giveaway, clear repayment terms, and more time for DAO review before this goes onchain.

One additional question: how are these proposals different from the past market maker agreements where we had strike price / option structures? In plain English, what is better or worse about this new structure compared to the prior ones? What benefit does the DAO get here that it did not get before?

Ideally, set minimums on liquidity.

Before approving a new agreement, I also think we should understand the outcome of the previous market maker agreements. When will the DAO know whether the prior market makers are returning CTX or USDC, and on what terms? It would make sense to see the result of those agreements before approving new ones.

Based on the current agreements, the expectation is that CTX will be returned pursuant to the applicable terms. We can provide additional detail on the status of those arrangements separately and as always, any returns will go directly to the DAO treasury.

Disclaimer: The information above is provided for governance discussion purposes only and is intended to summarize proposal terms as currently understood. Delegates should review the full proposal materials and independently evaluate the benefits, costs, risks, and tradeoffs associated with each proposal before voting. Any final arrangement remains subject to DAO approval. Delegates should also consider the potential implications of maintaining, modifying, or discontinuing market-making arrangements, including impacts on liquidity, trading activity, exchange listings, and broader market participation. Sustained reductions in liquidity and market quality may adversely affect exchange support and listing decisions, which remain within the discretion of the applicable exchanges.

7

Thanks for the feedback.

I think that’s a reasonable assessment of the tradeoffs between the two proposals and ultimately exactly what delegates should be evaluating.

For clarity, Proposal A supports Coinbase, Gemini, and Bitstamp, with approximately $15k of aggregate liquidity maintained within +/-2% across those venues at 99% uptime. Proposal A also includes a spread target below 0.5% and an alternative repayment structure tied to two separate 7-day TWAP periods.

Proposal B supports Coinbase and Bitstamp with 95-99% uptime, a minimum of $2k per side within 2% of the mid-price and $25k per side outside of 2% of the mid-price. Proposal B also utilizes a different option structure based on the price at the time of agreement plus 200%.

As for the retainer, separate funds have not been specifically earmarked for a market-making retainer under the current operational budget. If either proposal is approved, the DAO would need to determine how those obligations are funded.

On the 600k CTX point, I also understand the sentiment of those here. A broader discussion around preferred inventory levels would have been nice. We needed at least two options to share with community members. We received such on 6/5 and immediately shared them here.

That said, both counterparties independently proposed 600k CTX allocations and both indicated that was the minimum inventory level they were willing to support under their respective structures. While I understand the desire for a smaller allocation, based on the feedback we received, I am not convinced a materially different outcome would have been available to the DAO during this process versus the proposals it received.

Appreciate you taking the time to review the proposals and provide thoughtful feedback.

Disclaimer: The information above is provided for governance discussion purposes only and is intended to summarize proposal terms as currently understood. Delegates should review the full proposal materials and independently evaluate the benefits, costs, risks, and tradeoffs associated with each proposal before voting. Any final arrangement remains subject to DAO approval. Delegates should also consider the potential implications of maintaining, modifying, or discontinuing market-making arrangements, including impacts on liquidity, trading activity, exchange listings, and broader market participation. Sustained reductions in liquidity and market quality may adversely affect exchange support and listing decisions, which remain within the discretion of the applicable exchanges.

8

Thanks @Joecryptex.

@Mkatx5 asked whether the $5k/month retainer was already covered by the approved operational budget. The answer seems to be that it was not specifically earmarked. If that is the case, then before voting we need to know exactly how the retainer will be funded.

If it comes from the already approved budget and existing USDC, that should be stated clearly. If it requires new CTX sales or another treasury transfer, that is a material part of the proposal.

For me, 600k CTX plus a $60k annual retainer is too heavy. CTX is much more widely circulating now, there is already a lot of supply on exchanges. In my opnion, the DAO should be reducing inventory loans, not increasing or renewing them at this size.

I would be more open to a retainer if it were a pure retainer model where the market maker uses its own balance sheet. But combining a large CTX loan, option/TWAP upside, and a cash retainer feels like the DAO is taking too much treasury risk while also paying additional cash compensation.

So my concern remains: why should the DAO provide both the inventory and the retainer, while also giving up potential upside through option/TWAP mechanics?

If these two market makers are not willing to provide alternative structures and the DAO is not comfortable with the current tradeoffs, then I think you should be reaching out to additional market makers and asking for competing bids before the DAO votes on this proposal.

9

​Hello everyone,

​I am writing to officially endorse Proposal A and request that it be moved forward to a formal vote.

​While the community discussions regarding the 600,000 CTX loan amount are completely valid and worth keeping in mind and discussing further for future cycles, avoiding any interruption to our market-making services must be our immediate priority. Proposal A provides the clear operational structure and reliability we need to keep things moving smoothly without getting bogged down in extended negotiations.

​I support bringing this option to a vote so the community can finalize a decision

10

Hello everyone,

Thanks @Lcedeno24 for putting this together.

Liquidity is the lifeblood of the protocol. That’s why we need a reliable market maker to act as the heartbeat, ensuring the token’s availability across highly trafficked exchanges. Both options operate under the exact same requirements, but Proposal A clearly has the edge on uptime and offers much better balance on the spreads.

For the exact same $5,000 a month, Proposal A keeps the booth open longer (99% vs 95%), offers fairer prices to everyday buyers and sellers, and provides a much more robust engine for our infrastructure.

We could easily spend more time debating how to further optimize these settings, but maintaining momentum is critical right now. A solid step forward is better than stalling. I endorse moving Proposal A to a vote.

Allez!

11

Hi everyone,

After reviewing both proposals and the discussion, I am leaning toward supporting Proposal A.

While I share some of the concerns raised by other community members regarding the 600,000 CTX loan amount, the monthly retainer, and the need for greater transparency around funding and reporting, I believe Proposal A presents a clearer structure overall.

For me, the main advantages are the stronger operational commitments, including the 99% uptime target, the tighter spread requirements, and the fact that liquidity would be supported across three exchanges instead of two. Having coverage on Coinbase, Gemini, and Bitstamp provides broader market presence and diversification, which seems beneficial for CTX liquidity.

Overall, given the two options currently available, Proposal A appears to offer the stronger liquidity commitments and the clearest framework, which is why it has my support.

12

Hi all!

We’ve been following this discussion closely, both in Discord and the Forum, and we agree with a lot of the points raised by the other crypt-keepers. Like many of you, we would have preferred a smaller inventory loan, even though the CTX price is suffering at the moment, as the whole market is, and we do find the option mechanics a bit daunting; the prospect of a bull run where we end up effectively selling CTX at a lower price than its potential value is a real risk.

However, looking at the bigger picture, we’ve always advocated for a more diversified DAO treasury. Having stablecoins on hand gives us options: we could implement buyback mechanisms during market downturns, or simply cover operational expenses in USD rather than diluting our CTX holdings.

It seems that this hybrid model, combining a retainer with options on the inventory loan, is becoming an inevitable trend. We see this shift towards “Market Making as a Service” across other protocols. For example, Goldfinch DAO transitioned to a hybrid retainer-plus-loan framework (GIP-79) to move away from legacy options and gain better control over its treasury. Similarly, dYdX has used Pulsar for a sophisticated model that allows for treasury diversification via stablecoin repayment options, which is a great example of how these agreements can benefit the DAO beyond just liquidity provision. In the current macroeconomic climate, it’s increasingly rare to find top-tier market makers willing to work without a hybrid structure.

That said, we agree that we need to improve our process. We’re not suggesting the DAO should be directly negotiating these agreements; that’s a complex and longer discussion about the DAO’s legal structure that we would be happy to keep going, but we do think that we should be setting clear parameters beforehand. If keepers could align on hard lines or guidelines before the core team starts these engagements, it would better represent our collective vision. It wouldn’t guarantee the market makers will always meet our exact terms, but it would certainly make keepers feel more ‘present’ at the negotiation table.

Given the urgency and the reality that discontinuing market-making services now would be prejudicial to CTX and its holders, we believe that endorsing Proposal A is the more reasonable path forward at this time.

We look forward to the keepers and the core team’s feedback. Let’s make sure we establish a better process to avoid having to weigh in on such delicate and complex topics in such a rush in the future.

1 Like
13

Thank you for putting this up, @Lcedeno24.

Regarding the retainer selection, we are more inclined to support Proposal B, given its structurally stronger liquidity design. Rather than targeting a single aggregate depth figure, it enforces a tiered liquidity curve:

  • $2,000 per side within 2% of mid-price
  • $25,000 per side outside 2% of mid-price

So, even if price moves sharply, there is still depth available, ensuring resilience during volatility.

This is meaningfully different from Proposal A’s $15,000 aggregate depth commitment across both sides. That figure is roughly $2,500 per side ($7,500 on the three exchanges), so it’s essentially synonymous with B’s $2,000 on each side.

On uptime, as Joe mentioned, Proposal B targets 95–99% across Coinbase and Bitstamp, and existing Gemini coverage can be maintained through current delta-neutral arrangements, so venue continuity is not materially compromised relative to Proposal A.

Hence, we endorse proposal B and believe they are better suited for us.

__

That said, two process concerns deserve to be on the record.

First, the retainer structure was introduced without prior DAO alignment on funding source. As confirmed during the discussion, the $5,000/month retainer was not specifically earmarked in the approved operational budget. Normally, before this vote proceeds, the DAO should have had clarity on whether this obligation is covered by existing USDC, requires new CTX sales, or demands a separate treasury transfer.

Second, the timeline here is a pattern worth naming. Receiving final terms on June 5th, with a vote targeted within a week, doesn’t sit well with us. The proposals may be reasonable on their merits, but compressing deliberation on a 12-month, 600,000 CTX arrangement is not good governance hygiene, regardless of external timing pressures.

1 Like
14

I would like to endorse proposal B as well.

In addition to the points @DAOplomats made about the operating parameters, I feel proposal B is more likely to result in loaned CTX being returned. Given the state of our treasury, I would prefer to have tokens returned instead of sold at conditions that are favorable to the MM.

While obviously both proposals include options for CTX being purchased instead of returned, I believe option B makes that outcome less likely (or at worst makes us more likely to receive a higher amount for any exercised options).

With any type of upturn, proposal A seems very likely to result in the first 50% being purchased, and depending on the timing of the upturn potentially the second 50% as well. Unless I’m misunderstanding the terms, the token price would have to 6x by the 6-month point (AND continue to increase over the following 6 months in such a way that it would be in the MMs interest to exercise the second 50%) just to yield the amount that proposal B would yield if its +200% option were selected. In other words, in a situation where price goes up (desirable) but these tokens are purchased instead of returned (undesirable), proposal B at least maximizes what we get in return.

If there is no upturn, both proposals are likely to return tokens so this becomes a non issue.

1 Like
15

I agree with @DesertDwelr and @winverse here.

If these are the only two viable options in front of the DAO, I endorse Proposal B.

I understand Proposal B may require a different disclosure process if the counterparty does not want to be named publicly, but from a treasury and upside protection perspective I think B is the better structure for CTX holders compared to Proposal A.

16

With Proposal B eliminated from contention and no other proposals or amendments available after additional reachout by contributors, I am casting my vote FOR Proposal A. I still believe its terms are not favorable in several ways, but choosing between that and not having market liquidity (and the fallout that would most likely occur from that), I feel I have no choice but to support.

1 Like
17

I’m voting FOR Proposal A to avoid a liquidity gap, but I still need these five open items answered publicly:

  1. Where does the $5k/month retainer come from (new treasury budget, existing budget, or CTX sale)?
  2. Why did Wintermute not continue or submit a bid this cycle?
  3. Will there be public/aggregated KPI reporting (spread, depth, uptime, venue coverage) on a regular basis?
  4. Can we get a clean outcome report on prior MM deals (returns + performance + settlement path)?
  5. What is the proposed new legal/entity framework, and why can’t this be handled now under the current contributor process?

Thanks